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The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) introduced an amendment to the 
International Accounting Standard 39 – Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
(IAS 39) and to International Financial Reporting Standard 7 – Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures (IFRS 7) on 13 October 2008. These amendments allowed entities to reclassify 
non-derivative financial assets from the fair value option to historical cost. The purpose of this 
study is to explore how Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) applied the amendment 
to IAS 39 since 2008/2009. The study is guided by four main objectives in which the first two 
objectives explores how the G-SIBs applied the reclassifications during the allowed period, 
2008/2009 and the period beyond 2009 when the application of the standard should have 
been stopped. The study  further investigates if any G-SIBs used restatements to circumvent 
the requirements of the IAS 39 that does not allow reclassifications into and out of the 
‘designated as at fair value’ category. Finally, the study explores the impacts of the 
reclassifications on the G-SIBs’ ROE and total regulatory capital with the aim to determine if 
G-SIBs reaped any long-term benefits from the reclassifications and whether any traces of 
earning and capital management exist in the way G-SIBs applied the amendment to IAS 39.  
To achieve these objectives a comparative case study approach, which is qualitative in 
nature/scope was used with 10 G-SIBS forming part of the units of the analysis of the study. 
The study finds that: (i) 70 percent of G-SIBs reclassified assets during 2008/2009; (ii) a 
significant improvement on the reported net income was observed with a slight improvement 
on the return on equity and regulatory capital during 2008/2009, while the long-term impacts 
on ROE and total capital are insignificant; and (iii) G-SIBs did not restate comparative figures 
to evade the prohibition on reclassifications into and out of the ‘designated as at fair value’ 
category. As far as can be reasonably established, this kind of study has not been published 
before for G-SIBs. As such, the study contributes by including the analysis of G-SIBs and the 
long-term implications of applying the amendment to IAS 39 to the current literature, as well 
as adding another possible type of a restatement to the financial restatements’ literature. All 
these aspects are currently lacking in the existing literature.  
 
KEYWORDS: Capital Management, Earnings Management, Fair value accounting, G-SIBs, IAS 
39, net income, reclassifications, regulatory capital, restatements.  
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As the financial crisis deepened in the latter half of 2008, a heated debate erupted concerning 
how the value of financial instruments is measured by banks. Financial institutions disputed 
that the use of fair value accounting, as emphasised by the requirement to measure certain 
financial instruments at fair value consistent with IAS 39 and the reclassification options to 
reclassify financial instruments to fair value in line with the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standard (SFAS) 157, have introduced unnecessary volatility in the financial statements which 
compelled institutions to write-down substantial amount of their financial holdings during the 
period of economic downturn (Duh, Hsu and Alves, 2012). Arguments regarding the use of 
fair value accounting included the impacts of the pro-cyclicality of fair value in which the 
impacts of fair value accounting are acceptable during boom times when the earnings 
volatility contributes to increased profitability but rejected during market downturns when it 
results in losses (De Jager, 2010).  
 
When the crisis deepened, the banking industry became hard hit because of their substantial 
holdings of financial instruments by banks and, therefore, needed some form of relief. The 
Securities Exchange Committee (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) 
however, responded with a statement detailing how to implement SFAS 157 with regards to 
fair value measurement, which only brought some form of relief for the United States (U.S) 
banks as it allowed them to forgo the use of fair value in inactive markets (Fiechter, 2011). 
This movement fuelled political pressure on IASB and the European Commission, as European 
banks called for a levelled playing field which allows for the same accounting treatment of 
financial instruments as their U.S counterparts. The IASB eventually responded to the 
mounting pressure from bank managers, bank regulators and politicians by introducing an 
amendment to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 in October 13, 2008 at short notice without following the 
regular due process. The amendment allowed entities to reclassify non-derivative financial 
assets that were originally categorised as ‘held-for-trading’ or ‘available-for-sale’ and 
measured at fair value, to ‘held-to-maturity’ assets that are measured at amortised cost under 




This amendment attracted a lot of research examining the determinants of banks’ decisions 
to reclassify financial assets under IAS 39 amendment (Fiechter, 2011; Paananen, Renders 
and Shima, 2012; Quagli and Ricciardi, 2010). The studies examined whether banks were 
motivated to adopt the amendment to reclassify financial assets to enhance their capital 
adequacy ratios or the amendment was adopted by banks with earnings management 
motives. Fiechter (2011), Paananen et al (2012) and Quagli and Ricciardi (2010) found that 
banks that adopted the amendment avoided significant fair value losses and also reported 
higher capital adequacy ratios. Furthermore, banks that were on the verge of violating the 
minimum required capital ratio tend to have adopted the reclassification amendment 
(Paananen et al, 2012; Bischof, Bruggemann and Daske, 2012). Lim, Lim and Lobo (2013), find 
that the reclassification choice under the revised IAS 39 reduced the analysts’ ability to 
forecast earnings accurately and also increased the forecast dispersion. Using a sample of 
major European banks, Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010) find that the reclassifications of 
financial assets is influenced by the size of the bank, profitability, analysts’ thresholds and by 
banking laws of the entity’s home country. Furthermore, they also find that, large banks that 
experienced a decline in profitability are likely to reclassify financial assets (Kholmy and 
Ernstberger, 2010). 
 
Previous studies mentioned above, conducted their research on the entire population of 
banks without classifying banks into their systemic importance. Fiechter, Landsman, Peasnell 
and Renders (2017)’s study is the only one that examined the adoption of the amendment to 
IAS 39 by what is deemed the too important to fail (TITF) banks. Their results argue that TITF 
banks took less advantage of the reclassification opportunity because they were more likely 
to enjoy political protection and regulatory forbearance in the event that their regulatory 
capital fell below the stipulated minimum (Fiechter et al, (2017). The sample of banks deemed 
TITF used by Fiechter et al (2017) comprises of two groups of banks; those that are deemed 
too-big to fail (TBTF) and those domiciled in ‘no-fail’ countries. The TBTF banks are those 
banks that are so large and interconnected that their failure can be disastrous to the larger 
financial system and therefore, are supported by the government when they face potential 
failure. The sample of banks studied by Fiechter et al (2017) considers banks that are 
considered TBTF specifically to the European banking system and these banks comprises of 
other banks that are not considered to be globally systemic. On the other hand, the banks 
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that are domiciled in ‘no-fail’ countries are those situated in countries where no bank will be 
allowed to fail irrespective of the size of the bank (Fiechter, 2017). This study finds an existing 
gap in the literature in that the existing research has neglected studying how global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) applied the IAS 39 amendment. The study therefore, 
argues that some banks included in Fiechter et al (2017)’s sample are not globally large, 
systemic or important and hence, they may not have any impact on the global economic 
system should they fail since they have been included in the sample because they are 
important to the European economic system or by virtue of being located in countries where 
a bank is not allowed to fail. Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010) reports that the reclassification 
amendment is likely to be adopted by large banks whose profitability had plummeted and 
this to some extent makes it interesting to extend the existing literature by exploring how 
large systemically important banks, G-SIBs, applied the IAS 39 amendment during and after 
the 2008/2009 financial crisis. 
 
According to the Financial Stability Board, FSB (2011:1), Global Systemically Important Banks, 
also called systemic banks, are defined as “financial institutions whose distress or disorderly 
failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause 
significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.” The severity of the 
2008 global financial crisis, followed by the collapse of Lehman Brothers became a wakeup 
call for financial regulators and policy makers to prioritise regulatory matters concerning the 
too big, too complex and too interconnected to fail banks and this resulted in the FSB in 
conjunction with Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) publishing an initial list of 
banks considered as global systemically-important in 2011 (Peterson and Arun, 2018). This 
study makes use of the available systemic classification published by FSB in conjunction with 
BCBS to investigate how G-SIBs used the IAS 39 amendment during and after the financial 
crisis.  
 
The study argues that, because G-SIBs are large in size and have larger holdings of riskier 
assets, they were highly exposed to substantial fair value losses during the financial crisis than 
any other non-systemic banks. Due to this greater exposure, they may have not been willing 
to recognise substantial fair value losses and hence, the amendment to IAS 39 worked in their 
favour to avoid substantial fair value losses. The study argues against Fiechter et al (2017)’s 
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premise that the TITF banks are not incentivised to adopt the reclassification option because 
they enjoy taxpayer protection as well as regulatory leniency should regulatory capital decline 
below the minimum required level because of the simple fact that government intervention 
can come at a cost to the G-SIBs. Receiving government bailouts may expose G-SIBs to greater 
scrutiny from regulators, which could dent the banks reputation and public image. A damaged 
reputation has greater impact on how investors and depositors view the banks, which can 
have negative consequences for the banks. Managers also have self-interests which they are 
bound to protect because bad publicity can result in senior managers losing their jobs as well 
as government administrators taking over the management of the banks. Therefore, these 
costs associated with government intervention may motivate G-SIB managers to adopt the 
reclassification option which has a potential to relieve banks from reporting substantial fair 
value losses and thus, resulting in increased net income and regulatory capital.  
 
Another motivation for studying the G-SIBs is that, G-SIBs activities have a potential to affect 
global economic stability. Bank supervisors rely on reported income or earnings figures to 
judge the stability of banks and this may put pressure on G-SIBs to behave in a certain manner 
to accomplish the goals of financial system stability enforced by bank supervisors. As a result, 
G-SIBs can enhance their financial reporting to paint a picture that depicts stable earnings 
over time and to improve regulators’ opinion about their performance and stability. 
Therefore, policy amendment such as IAS 39 provides such an opportunity to banks to look-
back into their financials figures with the intention to make them appear healthy by applying 
the amendments retrospectively. 
 
The purpose of the study is to explore how G-SIBs applied the reclassifications amendment 
during the allowed period, 2008/2009 and the period beyond 2009 when the application of 
the standard should have been stopped. When exploring how G-SIBs applied the 
reclassification option during and after the 2008/2009 financial crisis, the study identifies 
three unique ways in which the reclassifications can be applied, which are basically the main 
focus of this study. The study is guided by four main objectives. The first objective of the study 
to explore how G-SIBs applied the reclassification option during the allowed period, the 
2008/2009 period by exploring the common types of reclassification choices applied by G-
SIBs during the period. The second objective is to explore how G-SIBs applied the amendment 
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during the period that can be deemed as the ‘not allowed’ period, which is the period beyond 
2009, when the application of the dispensation should have stopped following the gradual 
introduction of the IFRS 9. In this case, the study intends to find out the motives for the 
application of the dispensation after the allowed period. The third objective of the study is to 
investigate if any G-SIBs applied restatements to reclassify financial assets as observed in 
some non-systemic banks wherein they used restatements to circumvent the requirements 
of the IAS 39 amendment that does not allow reclassifications into and out of the designated 
as at fair value category. Finally, the last objective is to determine whether the adoption of 
this amendment has an advantage in the long term and if the G-SIBs reaped any long-term 
benefits from the reclassifications. When determining the impacts of these reclassifications, 
the study restricts itself to finding the effects on the two main ratios in the banking industry, 
the return on equity (ROE) and total capital ratios, and further determines if any traces of 
earning and capital management exist in the way G-SIBs applied the amendment.  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature on the reclassification choices of commercial 
banks (Fiechter, 2011; Kholmy and Ernstberger, 2010; Paananen, Renders and Shima, 2012; 
Quagli and Ricciardi, 2010) by exploring how the G-SIBs applied the IAS 39 amendment during 
the financial crisis, which has been lacking in the literature. In addition, the study contributes 
to the existing literature on the impacts of the reclassification choices by exploring if there 
are any long-term benefits reaped by the G-SIBs from the reclassifications. While a growing 
body of literature have examined the impacts of the IAS 39 reclassifications on commercial 
banks that applied the amended standard during the highly volatile period, no attention has 
been provided to the long-term effects of the reclassifications. Therefore, the study 
contributes to the accounting literature by exploring how the amendment to IAS 39 impacted 
the long-term performance of G-SIBs that reclassified financial assets during the volatile 
period.  Therefore, the results of the study contribute to the accounting literature by 
illustrating how the amendment to IAS 39 impacted the long-term performance of G-SIBs that 
reclassified financial assets.   
 
The study further contributes to the existing accounting literature on the types of financial 
restatements by exploring another possible type of a restatement that has never been 
explored before. This possible type of restatement involves restating previously reclassified 
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financial assets under  the presumption that the initial classification was erroneous. The type 
of restatement is, therefore, a crucial aspect especially for accounting standard-setters and 
bank supervisors. It assists in raising awareness to accounting standard-setters and bank 
supervisors that entities can be on the look-out for loopholes in the accounting standards, 
which can be used to their advantage. For instance, using one standard to get around the 
prohibited requirements of another standard. In this case some banks managed to apply IAS 
8 to circumvent the prohibition on the IAS 39 requirements. Therefore, this raises awareness 
for standard setters to be vigilant of such loopholes in future. This study differs from prior 
studies in that it focuses on the application of the amendment to IAS 39 by a group of banks 
considered to be systemically important to the global financial system and further attempts 
to find if there are any long-term benefits from the reclassification of financial assets.  
 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a theoretical overview 
of the earnings and capital management in the banking industry, the background around the 
amendment of IAS 39 as well as the techniques that financial institutions are found to apply 
in pursuit to manage earnings and regulatory capital. Section 3 outlines the research approach 
adopted by this study which includes the type of research design applied, the units of analysis 
selected for the research paper as well as the sources of data and how the data is analysed. 
The results of the study are presented in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5 where the study 
also attempts to generalise the results to theory. Lastly is Section 6 with limitations and 
recommendations for future research as well as the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
This section starts by reviewing the general literature on earnings management, discussing 
the motives for engaging in earnings management practices which is eventually narrowed to 
the banking industry to provide a broad overview of the prevalence of earnings management 
in the banking industry. It also includes the prevalence of capital management and the 
techniques applied by banks to execute both earnings and capital management motives, 
especially those techniques associated with the discretion granted by accounting standards. 
The discussion then extends to the literature on fair value accounting, reviewing the problems 
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associated with fair value accounting that lead to the revision of IAS 39 and eventually the 
reclassification of financial assets during the economic meltdown. The literature provides a 
better understanding of IAS 39 by providing an overview of the classifications of financial 
instruments under the IAS 39, the allowed reclassifications prior to the amendment, as well 
as the reclassifications under the reviewed IAS 39. It also provides the theoretical review of 
the 2008/2009 reclassifications, then attempts to draw a link between the adoption of the 
amendment to IAS 39 and earnings and capital management motives. Finally, the section 
concludes by discussing the ways in which 2008/2009 reclassifications can be applied.  
 
2.1 Earnings Management 
 
Earnings Management is an important concept in accounting literature which has been 
extensively studied. Healy and Wahlen (1999:368) assert that, “earnings management occurs 
when managers apply judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the firm or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.” This poses a question of the legality of this process, whether it is legal 
to engage in such manipulation of financial statements. Rahman, Monoruzzaman and Sharif 
(2013:23) explains the process as “reasonable and legal management decision-making and 
reporting intended to achieve stable and predictable financial results.” 
 
The extensive literature on earnings management provides various motives for listed firms to 
manage earnings, which include among others the three main motives which are, to satisfy 
and exceed projections of analysts and investors (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999); to 
avoid reporting earnings decreases and losses (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997); to report 
increases in earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Non-listed firms also see earnings 
management as important (Coppens and Peek, 2005; Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz, 2006; Hope, 
Thomas and Vyas, 2013). Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002), Burgsthaler and Dichev (1997), 
Burgstahler and Eames (2006), Charoenwong and Jiraporn (2009) and Degeorge et al (1999), 
document a higher proportion of firms meeting these three thresholds to avoid negative 
surprises to investors and analysts. Several other authors such as Brown (2001), Brown (2003) 
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and Matsumoto (2002) concur and have also discovered increasing cases of firms meeting or 
beating these benchmarks. Related to this field of research, Barth, Elliott and Finn (1999), 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) and Skinner and Sloan (2002) document the adverse 
price reactions in response to missing these targets. 
 
The pressure to meet analysts’ forecasts plays a major role in incentivising managers to 
exhibit earnings management behaviour. Analysts expect firms to meet their forecasts and 
never to deviate even by the smallest margin. Managers are as such, pressurised to impress 
analysts and investors, lest they assume the worst about the firms’ performance for missing 
the targets. The pressure causes managers to desire to meet or beat some analysts’ 
thresholds (Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). In a distribution of earnings surprises, Burgstahler 
and Eames (2006) find a remarkably higher frequency of zero (meeting the analysts’ estimates 
exactly) to small positive (beating the analysts’ estimates) forecast errors which provides 
evidence that managers are incentivised to meet or beat analysts’ targets. Degeorge et al 
(1999) substantiate the evidence by illustrating that managers tend to manage earnings that 
fell just short of these thresholds by increasing them to a level that equals or slightly exceeds 
analysts’ forecasts, while those far from the thresholds are reigned in to make them more 
achievable in the future. Consistent with the evidence, Brown (2001) also presents a 
distribution of earnings surprises fluctuating from small negative to small positive. In his 
further research, Brown (2003) argue that, managers are less inclined to report earnings that 
fall slightly below analysts’ estimates due to unfavourable valuation consequences of 
reporting negative earnings surprises. Using a sample of 250 Malaysian initial public offering 
firms over the period 1990 to 2003, Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell and Goodacre (2011) find 
evidence of managers revising earnings upwards to beat benchmarks to portray a healthy 
image of the firms’ performance to investors during periods of economic stress (the East Asian 
Crisis). These studies taken together, demonstrate why managers are prompted to apply 
whatever available techniques to manage earnings. It is for this reason that this study intends 
to establish if G-SIBs’ managers were also incentivised to adopt the IAS 39 amendment to 




Examples taken from Burgstahler & Dichev, (1997) 
 
1CEO Dana Mead stated in Tenneco’s 1994 annual report that, “I must emphasise that all of our strategic actions are guided 
and measured against this goal of delivering consistently high increases in earnings over the long term” (Burgstahler & 
Dichev, 1997:99). 
 
2In the release of 1994 earnings, Bank of America’s CEO Richard Rosenburg commented that, “Increasing earnings per share 




Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) argue that managing earnings to avoid reporting losses or 
decline in earnings, and to report earnings increases is common in many firms. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests a strong incentive to avoid reporting losses but to report a trajectory of 
earnings increases which is evidenced by managers’ emphasis in the opening sentences of 
most management discussions section of the annual reports1, press releases or earnings 
announcements2 (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) present 
evidence from their research which indicates that firms that recognise small pre-managed 
earnings decreases are likely to manage earnings upwards to attain earnings increases, while 
those with recognised small losses also manipulate reported net income upwards to avoid 
reporting losses. The evidence suggests a strong incentive to avoid reporting losses or 
negative earnings, but to maintain reporting increases in net income. 
 
Barth et al (1999) demonstrated that firms that have reported a series of consistent earnings 
increases are likely to exhibit higher price-to-earnings multiples or are priced at a premium 
and that, when this pattern of increasing earnings is broken, the premium is eliminated or 
reduced substantially. Likewise, DeAngelo et al (1996) find that breaking this pattern of 
constant earnings growth results in firms experiencing a decline of about 14 percent in the 
stock return in the year in which the consistent pattern is broken. Moreover, Skinner and 
Sloan (2002) and Kinney, Burgstahler and Martin (2002) provide empirical evidence that 
stocks reporting adverse earnings news or small earnings surprises tend to exhibit substantial 
negative abnormal stock returns. This strongly attests to why managers are incentivised to 
manipulate earnings to avoid losses, to keep up with positive trends of past earnings 
performance and to meet analysts’ expectations, perhaps because large stock penalties 




Due to the uncertain economic environment and the riskier assets held by G-SIBs, the fair 
value losses that can be suffered by these banks are substantial compared to any other non-
systemic bank. Deteriorated earnings mean analysts thresholds and internal earnings targets 
are likely to be missed which could send a negative signal to potential investors. Moreover, 
large as G-SIBs are and could be assisted by their respective governments when they are likely 
to fail, regulators and public scrutiny is likely to haunt them. The question then is, could IAS 
39 amendment have presented a scapegoat technique for G-SIBs to avoid realising substantial 
fair value losses during the financial crisis as well as after the crisis as the aftereffects of the 
adoption of the revised standard. This makes an interesting exploration to conduct to find out 
the motives for the adoption of the amendment and how G-SIBs have specifically applied it. 
 
2.2 Earnings and Capital Management in the Banking Industry 
 
The earnings management motives discussed above apply to banks as well. Beatty et al 
(2002), compared small changes in earnings of publicly held banks against privately held 
banks during the period 1987 to 1998 to determine whether these banks also exhibited signs 
of earnings management as evidenced in public firms by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and 
Degeorge et al (1999). They concluded that public banks also reported more small increases 
and fewer small declines in earnings than anticipated, while privately held banks reported 
only slightly fewer small declines in earnings than expected (Beatty et al, 2002). Moreover, 
public banks were found to be less likely than private banks to report declines in earnings 
(Beatty et al, 2002) which also corroborate with evidence that firms manage earnings to meet 
analysts’ forecasts. Similarly, using a sample of listed and unlisted US commercial banks from 
1996 to 2001, Barth et al (2017)’s results that banks with negative earnings avoid reporting 
losses as a way of managing earnings, is consistent with Beatty et al (2002)’s results. 
Charoenwong and Jiraporn (2009) also report that banks in Singapore and Thailand also 
exhibit earnings management behaviour wherein they avoid reporting losses and negative 
earnings. 
 
Due to regulatory capital requirements imposed on banks, banks with lower regulatory capital 
ratios are incentivised to increase regulatory capital or at least avoid substantial decline in 
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capital (Barth, Gomez-Biscarri, Kasznik and López-Espinosa, 2017). Consequently, banks are 
likely to manage earnings to accomplish maintenance of minimum regulatory capital. The 
basic premise of banks being incentivised to engage in capital management arises from the 
conflict to balance the expected regulatory costs with the opportunity costs of excess 
regulatory capital. Failure to meet the minimum regulatory capital can be costly for banks, as 
it can call for regulatory interventions, while holding excess capital is also costly as it forgoes 
investment returns that could be generated if the idle capital was invested elsewhere. 
Therefore, this creates a conflict for banks to strike a balance between the two costs. Moyer 
(1990) concurs that banks’ managers are incentivised to avoid or reduce regulatory costs 
imposed on banks for violating minimum regulatory capital ratio. Banks were mostly hit hard 
by the financial crisis, which resulted in most banks violating the minimum required 
regulatory capital threshold. However, banks that reclassified improved their capital ratios 
(Paananen et al, 2012) and the study intends to find out if the pattern exists as well among G-
SIBs. 
 
It can also be argued that the impact of solvency risk is a driving factor for capital management 
decisions. Bank insolvency is an indication of a higher probability of bankruptcy, hence, the 
need for banks to maintain a minimum regulatory capital as a primary cushion against 
unanticipated losses. Moreover, regulatory capital reduces agency conflicts between   
shareholders, depositors, creditors and guarantors (Leventis, Dimitropoulos and 
Anandarajan, 2011). Adequately capitalised banks provide assurance to depositors and 
creditors that the bank is sound and safe and thus, the capital subsequently determines the 
security of banks. Otherwise, depositors and creditors would demand higher deposit and 
lending interest rates, respectively, from inadequately capitalised banks. Similarly, Leventis 
et al (2011) posit that, banks’ capital is important for creating market confidence about the 
banks’ ability to handle uncertainty. In a nutshell, bank capital boosts market confidence. 
Therefore, this suggests that banks with high levels of insolvency risk have higher incentives 
for manipulating earnings in order to manage banks’ capital. Since G-SIBs have a larger 
holding of riskier assets, they can easily get closer to capital limit than other banks and would 
likely require more capital management as a result. 
__________________________________________________ 
 
3Earnings management that occurs through the accounting choice is referred to as Accrual-based earnings management. It 
entails, “changing accounting methods or estimates when presenting a given transaction in the financial statements, for 
example changing the depreciation method for fixed assets or changing estimates for provision for doubtful debts” (Zang, 
2012:676). 
 
4“Real activities manipulation is a purposeful action to alter reported earnings in a particular direction which is achieved by 
changing the timing or structuring of an operation, investment or financing transaction.” Zang (2012:676). 
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Earnings management and capital adequacy ratios are essentially linked (Leventis et al, 2011), 
and it can be difficult to separate a bank’s demand for increased earnings from its demand 
for managing regulatory capital because earnings are a source of best capital. As such, the 
accounting choices employed to manage earnings are often the same accounting choices 
used by banks to manage capital adequacy ratios. Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) 
argue that bank managers are incentivised to manage regulatory because regulators monitor 
banks using accounting-based capital measures. Pinto and Ng Picoto (2018) also contend that 
banks are incentivised to use the discretion accorded by accounting policies and standards to 
manipulate reported earnings and capital.  
 
Extensive research indicates that earnings and capital management can occur through two 
different strategies: (1) through accounting choice3 and (2) through the manipulation of real 
activities4 (Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury, 2016; McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Zang, 2012). 
Previous studies gave much attention to public firms than the banking industry because of 
the presumption that the banking industry is heavily regulated. However, those that 
investigated earnings and capital management in the banking industry focused on the use of 
discretionary accruals to manage bank accounting figures such as earnings and regulatory 
capital. Enomoto, Kimura and Yamaguchi (2015) argue that, since managers’ different 
estimates and judgements form part of the accruals process when they prepare financial 
statements, managers can opportunistically manage earnings by changing the accrual 
process.  
 
Various methods or techniques can be applied by banks’ managers to manage earnings as 
well as regulatory capital. Zhao (2019) lists methods applied to consist of, among others, 
managing loan loss provisions (LLPs), selective selling of available-for-sale securities, timing 
of securitisation transactions and biasing fair value estimates. Most extant studies have 
demonstrated that listed banks use LLPs for both earnings and capital management (e.g.,
12 
 
Anandarajan, Hasan and McCarthy 2007; Beatty et al, 1995; Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen, 
1995; Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Yang, 2004; Pérez, Salas-Fumás and Saurina, 2008). The banks 
put side a certain portion of the expected loan repayments as reserves for covering expected 
future losses on the banks’ loan portfolios and since these reserves rely on management’s 
judgement, they are susceptible to manipulation (Liu, Ryan, and Wahlen, 1997). However, 
prior studies provide mixed evidence concerning earnings and capital management through 
the use of LLPs.  
 
The literature finds systematic use of management discretion to use of LLPs for managing 
earnings (e.g., Collins et al, 1995; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Liu et al, 1997; Liu and Ryan, 1995; 
Pinto and Ng Picoto, 2018; Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson, 1990). However, the implementation 
of IFRS has greatly impacted the use of LLPs for earnings management (BCBS, 2015).  Evidence 
presents a substantial decline in the use of LLPs to manage earnings, especially for high-risk 
banks which were greatly involved in earnings management before the adoption of IFRS 
(Leventis et al, 2011). However, the classification of high-risk banks and low-risk banks used 
by Leventis et al (2011) was not based on the banks systemic importance to the entire banking 
system. 
 
While a considerable body of prior studies provide evidence on earnings management 
through the use of LLPs, the results for capital management are contradictory. The mixed 
conclusions existed even prior to the implementation of Basel I Accord in 1988. Prior studies, 
before the implementation of Basel I Accord, document that banks also used LLPs to 
manipulate the capital adequacy ratios (Beatty et al. 1995; Moyer 1990; Scholes et al, 1990). 
Beatty et al (1995) and Scholes et al (1990) report a negative relationship between LLPs and 
capital adequacy ratios which confirms the exhibition of capital management behaviour in 
banks. However, contrary to these studies, Collins et al, (1995) find no evidence of capital 
management behaviour. 
 
After Basel 1 Accord was implemented, Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999) found evidence 
of capital management in US banks when examining whether LLPs are used to manipulate 
capital adequacy ratios. Anandarajan, Hasan and Lozano-Vivas (2003) argue that the 
incentives for capital management are stronger for banks facing higher regulatory  penalties
__________________________________________________ 
 






for violating minimum regulatory capital. Wahlen (1994) provides evidence that bank 
managers use their discretion over the time which they report LLPs in order to avoid 
regulatory capital constraints. Anandarajan et al (2007) find that the Australian banks also 
used LLPs to manage earnings. However, no capital management evidence was found in the 
Spanish banking industries (Anandarajan et al, 2003; and Pérez et al, 2008), because of tight 
Basel rules for LLPs by the Spain’s national government (Pérez et al, 2008)5. Leventis et al 
(2011) argue that restrictions imposed by the Basel I Accord assisted in reducing banks 
incentives to manipulate capital adequacy ratios using LLPs.  
 
Recent study by Peterson and Arun (2018) presents evidence that capital regulation and 
economic uncertainty may incentivise systemic banks to smooth income using some 
accounting figures, especially loan loss provisions. The study further finds a higher exhibition 
of income smoothing behaviour among G-SIBs in the post-crisis period (Peterson and Arun, 
2018). However, profitable G-SIBs with sizeable non-performing loans, capital adequacy ratios 
exceeding the minimum required regulatory capital ratio and engaged in forward-looking LLPs 
were found to be susceptible to income smoothing during recessionary periods (Peterson and 
Arun, 2018).  The implication of Peterson and Arun’s study is that G-SIBs manipulate 
accounting figures through the discretion afforded to them by accounting policies in order to 
meet minimum regulatory capital thresholds. This suggests that during the unfavourable 
economic conditions, G-SIBs are more susceptible to earnings management activities. In 
addition to using LLPs, Beatty et al (1995) and Moyer (1990) find evidence that banks also use 
securities gains and losses to reduce earnings variability and to confirm earnings increase 
trend or to eliminate small earnings decreases, as well as manage capital. Scholes et al (1990) 
find that banks with low levels of regulatory capital tend to realise securities gains to increase 
book income and hence, boost regulatory capital. Since realising securities gains (postponing 
securities losses) result in increased book regulatory capital, it enhances banks’ ability to 
attract deposits at lower rate of deposit because depositors view the bank as safe and sound 







Using a sample of listed and unlisted US commercial banks from 1996 to 2001, Barth et al 
(2017) find that the discretion that managers have over accounting for available-for-sale 
securities gains and losses allows banks to manage regulatory capital and earnings. These 
results are consistent with evidence from prior studies which suggests that banks use realised 
securities gains and losses to increase regulatory capital that have fallen below the minimum 
threshold (Moyer, 1990). Furthermore, Karaoglu (2005) finds that banks tend to use gains 
from loans whose market values are above their carrying values, as well as overvaluing 
retained interests from securitisation to enhance earnings and regulatory capital. 
 
2.3 Fair Value Accounting 
 
During the years of economic prosperity, before the global financial crisis, the IASB proposed 
a single method of measuring financial assets with the aim to reduce complexity in financial 
reporting, and, fair value accounting (FVA) was deemed to be the most appropriate method 
(Fiechter, 2011). Proponents of FVA contend that FVA is the most relevant method because 
it aligns the present economic conditions to the economic resources and obligations; it 
provides a faithful representation of the true value of financial assets and liabilities; and that 
it is a market-based measure that is unaffected by factors specific to an entity (Barth, 2007; 
Penman, 2007). Fiechter (2011) also explains that FVA was believed to have increased 
financial institution transparency, hence assisting investors to understand the banks’ risk 
profile. Despite these merits associated with the use of FVA, the topic became a key issue in 
accounting debate (Walton, 2006). 
 
At the peak of the 2008 financial crisis, excessive political pressure was exerted on IASB to 
revise the IAS 39, as the requirements for measuring certain financial assets were causing a 
major concern among bankers and politicians (Bengtsson, 2011). Critics contended that, fair 
value accounting was exacerbating the severity of the crisis by “increasing banks’ earnings 
volatility as a result of recognising losses on securitised assets whose values had plunged” 
(Duh, Hsu and Alves, 2012:23) and that, an excessive write-down of financial assets values 







volatility caused by FVA tend to be welcomed during boom times because it contributes to 
higher profits, but during periods of downturns FVA is actively rejected because it leads to 
losses. During boom times, FVA increases banks’ regulatory capital making banks appear like 
safe havens and less risky, hence, encouraging banks to increase their leverage (De Jager, 
2010). However, during a liquidity crunch, observed market prices tend to deviate from 
assets’ fundamental values and thus, writing down assets at these distorted prices depletes 
banks’ capital (Laux and Leuz, 2010). These assets write-downs cause capital ratios to fall, 
resulting in banks deleveraging and selling further assets at distorted prices and thus, creating 
a downward spiral leading to contagion (Laux and Leuz, 2010). As such, bank regulators, 
bankers and politicians blamed fair value accounting for aggravating the impact of the 2008 
financial crisis and hence, put pressure on IASB to revise IAS 39. 
 
Responding to this political pressure and the intensifying financial crisis, the IASB introduced 
an amendment to IAS 39 on 13 October 2008 (Fiechter, 2011). The amendment was adopted 
by the European Commission to alleviate the effects of the crisis and provide the European 
entities the same flexibility as entities applying the United States Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (U.S GAAP). More specifically, the amendment allowed entities to 
reclassify non-derivative financial assets that were initially classified as ‘held-for-trading’ or 
‘available-for-sale’ and measured at fair value, to ‘held-to-maturity’ assets that are measured 
at amortised cost, under certain circumstances (Schwarz et al, 2014). Allowing entities to 
reclassify their assets retrospectively from fair value to historical cost categories, was IASB’s 
response to preventing the financial sector from crumbling. The amendment to IAS 39 
provided a potential to relieve banks of the regulatory pressure they faced as a result of 
exposure to substantial future fair value losses.  
 
2.4 The 2008/2009 Reclassifications 
 
IAS 39 classified financial instruments into four categories as illustrated in figure 1 below. 
Trading securities (HFT) and financial securities designated at fair value option (FVO) are 







(FVTPL). Loans and receivables (LAR) and marketable debt instruments classified as held-to-
maturity (HTM) are measured at amortised cost (Bischof, Bruggemann and Daske, 2012). 
Lastly is the available-for-sale (AFS) securities measured at fair value with fair value gains and 
losses recognised directly to shareholder’s equity through other comprehensive incomes 
(FVTOCI). After initial recognition, five types of reclassifications measured at fair value are 
possible, but IAS 39 mandated only one reclassification of AFS securities into the HTM 
category (Bischof et al, 2012). And to instil discipline on institutions, reclassification of 
financial instruments into or out of the fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL) category was 
prohibited before the October 2008 amendment (IAS 39, para. BC73). 
 
Figure 1: Classification of Financial Assets under IAS 39 
 
Source: Feichter, 2011:51 
 
 
The amended IAS 39 allowed entities to reclassify financial assets retrospectively to any date, 
for periods between 1 July and 31 October 2008 (IAS 39, para. 103H). However, for periods 
beginning on or after 1 November 2008, any reclassification of financial assets took effect 
only from the date when the reclassification was made. These amendments to IAS 39 were 
applicable only to non-derivative financial assets (IASB, para.50(a), 2008:2), not designated at 
fair value through profit or loss upon initial recognition (IASB, para.50(b), 2008:2), and only if 
certain criteria were met (IASB, para.50B, 50D and 50E, 2008:2) as illustrated in figure 2 
below. The revised standard allows reclassification of financial holdings out of the HFT to LAR, 
HTM or AFS and out of AFS categories to LAR (IASB, para. 50(c), 2008:2). Assets for which the 







Figure 2: Amendment of IAS 39 for the Reclassification of Financial Instruments Published 
in October 2008 
 
 Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers. 
 
 
This amendment attracted a lot of controversial and dissenting opinions regarding whether it 
was a well thought development or not.  Critiques questioned the amendment’s supposed 
effort of increasing international convergence of accounting standards to be rather 
decreasing it, because impairments rules for reclassified assets measured at amortised cost 
are less restrictive under IFRS than under the US-GAAP (Bischof et al, 2010). The amendment 
was therefore, not levelling the ground field as claimed by IASB. Analysts also criticised the 
amendment on the basis that it dented investor confidence. Quagli and Ricciardi (2010) stated 
that, even IASB itself had acknowledged that the new reclassification possibilities posed an 
inherent risk of being adopted by entities that wish to avoid reporting substantial fair value 
losses. Fiechter et al (2017) and Lim, Lim and Lobo (2013) concur that, by reclassifying 
financial assets, the revised standard has the potential to relieve banks from regulatory 









There seem to have been much controversy stirred by the IAS 39 amendment which propelled 
a great deal of accounting research. Extant research has investigated the underlying 
determinants of the individual banks’ decisions to reclassify financial assets in accordance 
with the IAS 39 amendment. Using samples of European and worldwide banks applying IFRS, 
Fiechter (2011) and Bischof et al (2012), respectively, provide evidence that one third of banks 
in both samples took advantage of the reclassification opportunity offered by the IAS 39 
amendment. Fiechter (2011)’s results indicate that, the reclassifications allowed banks to 
avoid extensive fair value losses, and thus, reported substantially higher levels of return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) while Bischof et al (2012) find that firm-specific 
profits increased by 44 percent on average. In a sample of 71 publicly traded banks in Europe, 
Quackly and Ricciardi (2010) find that more than 75 percent of reclassifying banks exhibited 
earnings management behaviour. Fiechter et al (2017), Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010), 
Paananen et al (2012) and Quackly and Ricciardi, (2010) also find that reclassifying banks 
avoided extensive fair value losses and hence, reported increased earnings, as well as higher 
regulatory capital after reclassification. Additionally, Paananen et al (2012) and Bischof et al 
(2012) document that banks that were more exposed to substantial fair value losses and also 
capital constrained were highly likely to reclassify their financial assets to avoid violating 
regulatory restrictions that would attract regulatory interventions.  
 
Fiechter et al (2017) further argue that, most of the European banks that reclassified financial 
holdings were more probably capital constrained than those banks that did not, which 
corroborate Paananen et al (2012) and Bischof et al (2012)’s results. Consistent with the 
likelihood that poorly capitalised banks had the motive to adopt the reclassification 
opportunity presented by IAS 39 amendment, Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010) also 
demonstrate that, in a sample of 101 European banks, those that opted to reclassify were 
likely to be large banks that had recognised a decline in profitability. Generally, these studies 
suggest that commercial banks opportunistically adopted the amendment to IAS 39 as a tool 









Fair value accounting has been blamed for increasing the volatility of earnings and of other 
balance sheet variables like capital ratios and as such, this may affect how the market prices 
risk, which may consequently increase uncertainty of variables that rely on earnings such as 
capital ratios, as well as managers’ compensations. Therefore, bank managers may be 
motivated to misrepresent earnings; to smooth earnings and reduce earnings volatility; and 
to manage regulatory capital, thereby signalling lower risk to the market and consequently 
being able to achieve stable managerial compensations.  
 
The focus of the previous studies was to examine whether banks were motivated to adopt 
the amendment to reclassify financial assets to enhance their earnings or capital adequacy 
ratios which contributes to the realm of earnings and capital management literature. 
However, the existing literature is based on studies conducted on the entire population of 
banks without classifying banks into their systemic importance. The studies do not 
differentiate the behaviour of the systemically important banks from those of the non-
systemically important banks with regards to the adoption of the reclassification amendment.  
 
In so far as the reclassification literature is concerned, Fiechter et al (2017), is the only study 
that investigated if TITF banks adopted the reclassifications option and they present evidence 
that the banks did not take advantage of the reclassification opportunity because of the 
political protection that insulates them from regulatory pressure. However, within the same 
study, Fiechter et al (2017) examine the reclassifications that were made out of the trading 
category by a subsample of banks from non-prudential filter countries and find that TITF 
banks are likely to opt to reclassify out of HFT into AFS than non-TITF banks. Basically, Fiechter 
et al (2017)’s results do not suggest that there were completely no reclassifications among 
TITF banks, but they were however, not as significant as those of non-TITF banks. Their results 
suggest that the managers accounting choices are influenced by the significance of the entity 
to the economy in which they are located, as evidenced by non-TITF banks’ accounting 
choices being mostly influenced by the need to adhere to the regulatory requirements, while 
on the other extreme, TITF banks’ accounting decisions are relatively not influenced by 







Despite the results by Fiechter (2017), this study argues that, because of the importance of 
G-SIBs to the entire global economic system and the threat that they pose should just one 
bank collapse, it forces bank supervisors to scrutinise and closely monitor G-SIBs’ activities. 
And, since bank supervisors rely on reported income or earnings figures to judge the stability 
of banks, G-SIBs may be incentivised to manipulate their earnings figures to achieve the said 
financial stability. The study argues that the pressure to comply with regulatory requirements 
may force G-SIBs to behave in ways that enable them to achieve the goals of financial system 
stability enforced by bank supervisors. Therefore, G-SIBs are likely to enhance their financial 
reporting to depict a stable picture of earnings over time, which may alter regulators’ opinion 
about their performance and stability. Based on this premises, the study predicts that G-SIBS 
are likely to adopt policy amendments that offer reclassification opportunities with potential 
to relieve them from recognising substantial fair value losses, as well as deteriorating capital 
adequacy ratios. This study is different from prior studies and it seeks to understand and 
explore how global systemically important banks reporting under the International Financial 
Reporting System (IFRS) applied the reclassifications since 2008/2009. Unlike Fiechter et al 
(2017)’s sample which is comprised of banks that are deemed too big to fail and those 
domiciled in ‘no-fail’ countries, this study focuses on a small sample of banks listed as global 
systemically important banks by the FSB in collaboration with BCBS.  
 
The study intends to explore how G-SIBs applied the reclassification choices in terms of the 
reclassification categories adopted by the G-SIBs, the reasons for such reclassifications and 
how such reclassifications impacted the income and balance sheet figures. In exploring how 
the G-SIBs applied the reclassifications, the study makes reference to three main ways in 
which reclassifications can be applied which are: the reclassifications that applied to the 
allowed period between 2008 and 2009; the reclassifications that applied to the not allowed 










2.5 Reclassifications applicable to the allowed period between 2008/2009 
 
In exploring how G-SIBs applied the reclassifications in 2008/2009, the study recognises that 
all previously conducted studies examined the implications of the amendment to IAS 39 
reclassification decisions during 2008 and 2009, when the economic conditions were highly 
volatile. However, no study has extended its investigations further than 2009 to examine the 
effects of the reclassifications, if any, on the years beyond the financial crisis. Different from 
these studies, this study examines how the reclassifications were applied and extends the 
analysis to cover a protracted period of 10 years, specifically from 2008 to 2017. The study 
intends to examine whether the adoption of this amendment has an advantage in the long 
term and if the banks reaped any long-term advantages from the reclassifications made 
during 2008/2009.  This includes examining the types of reclassification choices adopted by 
the G-SIBS and examining whether the most commonly applied reclassification choices 
indicate any preference by banks to improve the net income or the banks equity/regulatory 
capital. Existing literature indicates that banks that reclassified in accordance with the 
amended IAS 39 reaped benefits in terms of improved reported earnings and capital 
adequacy ratios. 
 
Reclassifications from HFT category to AFS and LAR categories have the potential to increase 
earnings. A reclassification from HFT to AFS affects the net income only and not the equity, 
since fair value gains or losses continue being recognised in the revaluation reserves as part 
of shareholders’ equity but are nevertheless, recognised in other comprehensive income 
rather than the income statement.  The reclassification from HFT to LAR will, however, affect 
both the net income and the equity since the fair value gains or losses cease being recognised 
in the income statement, and hence in equity. These two forms of reclassifications, therefore, 
can assist banks to avoid substantial fair value losses from being recognised in the net income 
and hence equity during the financial crisis when financial assets values have plunged. 
 
The reclassification option that increases equity would be the reclassification from HFT and 







fair value losses previously recognised in the net income and other comprehensive income, 
respectively, cease being recognised there. Therefore, due to the difficult economic 
conditions with assets realising fair value losses, such a reclassification that avoids fair value 
losses from being recognised in both the net income and equity may assist banks that are 
capital constrained to avoid reporting deteriorating capital ratios or alternatively assist banks 
to increase their reported equity.  
 
Given these alluded reclassifications, it can be predicted that banks may have adopted a lot 
of reclassifications from the HFT and AFS categories to LAR since such reclassifications 
increases both the net income and equity, unlike the reclassifications from HFT category to 
AFS category. The benefits of the latter reclassification may be stronger on the net income 
and would not affect shareholders equity because fair value gains and losses are still 
considered in the revaluation reserves as part of shareholders equity but are now reported in 
OCI rather than profit or loss account. 
 
The discretion accorded by the amendment to IAS 39 to reclassify non-derivative financial 
assets retrospectively causes an interest to understand if the decisions to reclassify were 
driven by unbiased intentions and ability to hold the financial assets for a foreseeable future 
or the impossibility to estimate fair values, or perhaps managerial decisions were merely 
stirred by the incentives to meet specific earnings thresholds. The allegations that FVA 
amplified the impact of the financial crisis make it reasonable to assume that banks on the 
verge of failing to achieve their earnings benchmarks because of massive asset write-downs 
at distorted prices, may have found an opportunity to look-back into their figures and apply 
the amendment to attain their earnings targets. Perhaps, banks used the opportunity to 
window-dress their books to appear healthy to bank regulators, potential investors and 
depositors in order to be able to source capital at a lower cost and to also prevent depositors 
from panicking and withdrawing their deposits or demanding higher interest rates on their 
deposits. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) assert that one of the important motivations 
for earnings manipulation is the banks managers’ wish to attract external financing at low 







ratios signal to investors that the banks would perform worse in future. Therefore, since 
investors, creditors, depositors and other external stakeholders use accounting information 
to measure the financial health of entities before making their investment decisions, banks 
managers may have been under pressure to make their books look appealing, and hence, the 
amendment to IAS 39 may have presented a perfect opportunity for banks to align their 
earnings objectives by reclassifying their financial assets.  
 
2.6 Reclassifications applicable to the not allowed period - 2010 to 2017 
 
In an attempt to examine how G-SIBs applied the reclassifications during the 2008/2009, it is 
crucial to remember that the amendment was exclusively for a limited period of time, to 
alleviate the impact of the financial crisis.  The amendment was intended to be short-lived, 
hence why its introduction did not even follow the regular standard-setting procedure. 
Therefore, the expectation is that, banks should have ceased applying the dispensation after 
the crisis and adopted the gradually introduced IFRS 9 since the revision of IAS 39 was not 
intended to be an expansion of fair value measurement. Seeing that during the crisis the 
amendment tend to have yielded positive effects in terms of increasing earnings and 
regulatory capital of commercial banks that adopted the amendment as alluded by the 
existing literature, it is interesting to find out if the positive results have not created a habit 
among the G-SIBs to continue using the allowance even after the window period. This makes 
it interesting to determine whether any G-SIBs applied the amendment beyond the allowed 
period and the reasons advanced by banks on such reclassifications. No studies have so far 
attempted to find out if any banks extended the use of the IAS 39 reclassifications beyond its 
timeframe and thus no literature exists on this. 
 
2.7 The use of restatements to reclassify financial assets 
 
When exploring how the reclassification choices were applied, an important aspect of 







requirements stipulated by the amended standard were applied correctly. According to the 
amended IAS 39, financial liabilities, derivatives and financial assets that are designated as at 
fair value through profit and loss on initial recognition cannot be reclassified (Deloitte, 
2008:1). The amendment to IAS 39 does not permit reclassifications into and out of the 
designated as at fair value category.  Despite the amendment to IAS 39 reiterating that such 
reclassifications into and out of the designated as at fair value category are prohibited, some 
banks seem to have found a way of circumventing this prohibition. De Jager (2014) finds that 
Standard Bank of South Africa (SBoSA) restated comparative figures to avoid the prohibition 
on reclassifications of assets into and out of the ‘designated as at fair value’ category. He finds 
that, “significant accounting restatements, where comparative figures were different from 
those in the annual report for the financial year to which they refer, were evident in 2011 
(2010 figures were adjusted), 2008 (2007 figures were adjusted) and 2007 (2006 figures were 
adjusted)” (De Jager, 2010:144). Upon probing SBoSA about the kind of reclassifications 
made, the bank explained that the reclassifications were initially errors which in terms of IAS 
8, can be corrected when spotted. Therefore, according to the bank’s response, the 
reclassifications were not reclassifications as contemplated by the amendment to IAS 39, 
however, it was rectification of errors that were never supposed to have  initially occurred. 
 
This presents an interesting link between restatements and reclassifications that requires to 
be explored because banks could have basically adopted this as a tool to get around the 
prohibited reclassification rule, that is, restating previously reclassified financial assets into 
and out of the designated as at fair value category. Therefore, this presents  a possible type 
of a financial restatement, where previously reclassified assets are restated to circumvent the 
requirements of IAS 39. By nature of restatements, they provide managers with what is 
known as a “look-back option” which enables managers to look into historic numbers and 
determine whether a particular restatement can enhance previously reported figures in order 
to make them look and tell the story they wish to portray to the users of financial statements. 
This behaviour was also spotted on Nedbank Group 2009 Annual Report where some 
investment securities were reclassified from available-for-sale (AFS) category to designated 







apply the restatement option to reclassify financial assets, thus, resulting in another sub-
research objective to determine whether any G-SIBs restated previously reclassified assets. 
 
Currently, there is no literature on this possible type of restatements. However, a large body 
of literature exists explaining the underlying motives for financial restatements in general 
(Plumlee and Yohn, 2010; Ciesielski and Weirich 2006). Some studies attempted to find the 
impact of restatements on restating firms and have documented increases in the cost of 
capital after restatements, owing to reliance on private debt financing which comes at a 
higher cost and more stringent contract terms after restatements (Chen, Cheng and Lo, 2013; 
Graham, Li and Qiu, 2008; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Shi and Zhang, 2008). Other studies 
revealed that equity values tend to drop following announcement of restatements due to 
dented investor confidence (e.g., Anderson and Yohn 2002; Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz, 
2004; Wilson, 2008). Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson (2008), Kravet and Shevlin (2010), Wilson 
(2008) and Xu, Najand and Ziegenfuss (2006) attributed the confidence crisis to the decrease 
in accounting credibility and quality of information than previously perceived. 
 
According to Plumlee and Yohn (2010:42), 57 percent of restatements filed in the United 
States from 2003 to 2006 are associated with internal company errors while 37 percent is 
found to be “some characteristic of the accounting standards.” Of the 37 percent associated 
with some characteristic of the accounting standards, 58 percent are related the accounting 
standards ambiguity, while 37 percent are related to the use of management discretion in 
applying the standards. However, most authors argue that restatements are mostly driven by 
the complexity of accounting standards (Ciesielski and Weirich, 2006; Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), 2008). Other authors contend that the rise in financial restatements can 
be attributable to the increase in earnings manipulation and firms’ focus on meeting or 
exceeding earnings benchmarks which have resulted in deliberate misapplication of 
accounting principles in order to meet earnings thresholds that will ultimately require to be 
restated when the earnings management is uncovered (Desai, Hogan and Wilkins, 2006; 







Yohn, 2010; Srivastava and Swanson, 2007). According to GAO report (2002), almost half of 
the SEC’s enforcement cases since the late 1990’s involved revenue recognition violations. 
 
These previous studies assist in understanding what causes firms to restate their financial 
statements and the kind of restatements firms are engaged on. In addition to this literature, 
this study attempts to find out if this new type of restatement which has brought up a link 
between restatements to correct errors in accordance with IAS 8 and reclassification of 
financial assets in accordance with IAS 39 amendment exists among G-SIBs and the impact of 
such restatements on the balance sheet and income statement figures of the G-SIBs. 
 
The prohibited reclassification of assets into and out of the designated as at fair value (FVO) 
category can occur in eight different ways, and the effects of such reclassifcations on the net 
income and equity are summarised in Table 1 below.  
 





Reclassifications out of FVO into HFT and vis-a-vis have no effect in the net income and equity 







Reclassifying out of FVO into LAR or HTM affects both the net income and equity because fair 
value gains and losses cease being recognised in the profit or loss and, therefore, in equity. A 
reverse reclassification out of LAR or HTM into FVO affects both the net income and equity 
since fair value changes start to be recognised in profit or loss and, hence, in equity. The 
movement out of the FVO into AFS affects net income but not equity because fair value gains 
and losses are still considered in the revaluation reserves as part of shareholders equity but 
are now reported in other comprehensive income (OCI) rather than profit or loss. The 
reclassification out of AFS into FVO, the FV changes are also still considered as part of 
shareholders equity but are now accounted for in the profit or loss account rather than OCI.  
 
In summary, these studies taken together indicate a lack of research on the adoption of the 
IAS 39 by the global systemically important banks and hence, this study attempts to fill the 
gap by exploring the 3 ways in which reclassification choices can be applied by focusing on 
only the G-SBIs. 
 
3. Research Approach 
3.1 Research Design 
 
This study intends to explore how G-SIBs applied the IAS 39 reclassifications since the 
2008/2009 financial crisis and the impact/implications of the adoption of this revised 
standard on financial statements. The study is by necessity and design a qualitative research. 
The purpose of a qualitative research is to provide answers to the ‘what’, ‘how’ or ‘why’ of a 
phenomenon and not the ‘how many’ or ‘how much’, which are answered by quantitative 
research. This type of research question aims at uncovering how a phenomenon, in this case, 
the IAS 39 reclassifications were applied since the 2008/2009 financial crisis which is a 
phenomenon that cannot be predicted in advance, thus, requiring an in-depth understanding 
of the motivations behind the application of IAS 39 reclassifications. As such, the type of 







the problem. Despite choosing a qualitative approach, the study does not completely exclude 
the use of quantitative data. 
 
Arguments about the appropriateness of qualitative or quantitative research approaches 
have been debatable. However, each of the two approaches has its own inimitable ways of 
gathering and analysing data. The end objective of both approaches is the same even though 
they have unique strengths and logic from applying various techniques and procedures 
(Maxwell, 2004; Maxwell and Loomis, 2002).  
 
A qualitative research is exploratory in nature. It is used when the emphasis is to uncover an 
understanding of the underlying reasons, motivations and factors that influence decision 
making and opinions (Zikmund, Babin, Carr and Griffin, 2013; Schindler, 2019). It does so by 
allowing for deeper probing into the problem which can assist with ideas or hypothesis 
development that can lead to possible quantitative research (Zikmund et al, 2013). Qualitative 
research can also be applied to reveal trends in thought and opinions and provides an in-
depth exploration of the problem. On the other extreme is the quantitative research which 
quantifies the problem through the use of numerical data or data that can be transformed 
into useful and meaningful statistics (Zikmund et al, 2013). Quantitative research takes 
behaviours, attitudes, opinions and other variables and transform them into a quantifiable 
measure that can be generalised from a greater sample population (Schindler, 2019).  
 
Qualitative research can be conducted in many ways using various techniques. This study uses 
a comparative or multiple case study design or technique, specifically consisting of 10 G-SIBs.  
Yin (2009:18) defines a case study as, “an empirical inquiry about a contemporary 
phenomenon (e.g., a “case”), set within its real-world context especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” This definition of a case study 
suggests that there are at least three aspects that make it relevant to use the case study 
method as a research method. The most important aspect is the type of research question 
that the study is attempting to address (Shavelson and Towne, 2002). It is appropriate to use 







question; an exploratory question – the “how” type of question; or an explanatory question, 
that is the “why” type of research question. The other important aspect is when investigating 
a real-world phenomenon that allows for collection of data in natural settings, rather than 
depending on “derived” data (Bromley, 1986; Yin, 2009). The last important aspect that 
makes a case study an appropriate research approach is when the researcher has little or no 
control over the events (De Jager, 2010).  Therefore, in this case the study poses an 
exploratory type of a research question. 
 
The problem associated with single case studies is the lack of generalisability of the results of 
the cases studied, as well as numerous information-processing biases (Eisenhardt 1989:538). 
Therefore, to respond to these biases, this study applies a multiple-case approach which 
comprises of 10 G-SIBs. The motive for a multi-case study approach is to “augment external 
validity and help guard against observer biases” (Leonard-Barton 1990:258-259). Moreover, 
multi-case sampling assist with increasing the confidence of the results and enabling the 
researcher to point out some common and unique traits across the cases studied (De Jager, 
2010), as well as allowing for a deeper and richer look at each case (Meyer,2001:333). 
 
3.2 Selection of Units of Analysis  
 
The units of analysis of this study consist of 10 global systemically important banks reporting 
under IFRS because the study focuses on the accounting choice in IAS 39. The study uses the 
2018 list of G-SIBs published in November 16, 2018 by the FSB in collaboration with BCBS. 
This list assists in identifying banks that are considered to be systemic. The published list 
consists of 29 banks considered to be global systemically important. Of the 29 G-SIBs, 16 
banks apply IFRS, 9 report under the United States GAAP, 2 under the Japanese GAAP while 1 
each under the Canadian GAAP and the People Republic of China (PRC) GAAP, respectively. 
G-SIBs reporting under the US and  Japanese are excluded from the group of banks analysed 
by the study because the amendment to IAS 39 did not apply to them since the reclassification 
options were already allowed under the US GAAP. The IAS 39 amendment was aimed at 







however, includes banks reporting under the PRC and Canadian GAAP, because, similar to the 
IFRS reporting banks, certain reclassification options were previously prohibited. However, 
the amendments were passed on in October 2008 with the effective date being August 1, 
2008 for the Canadian GAAP. 
 
After including the banks reporting under the Canadian and PRC GAAP to the 16 IFRS reporting 
banks, the total group of banks illegible to use the IAS 39 reclassification amendment 
becomes 18. However, 3 G-SIBs are excluded due to lack of sufficient data while 5 are 
excluded because they did not apply the dispensation and have explicitly stated so in their 
annual reports. This results in the final case study group consisting of 10 G-SIBs as illustrated 
in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Case Study Group Selection Process 
Units of Analysis 
Total G-SIBs 29 
Exclude US-GAAP reporting banks -9 
Exclude Japanese GAAP reporting banks -2 
Total Banks Eligible to use IAS 39 amendment 18 
Exclude banks with insufficient data -3 
Sub - Case Study Group 15 
Exclude non-reclassifying banks -5 
FINAL CASE STUDY GROUP 10 
 
 
Table 3 below provides a breakdown by country of the group of banks with available data that 






















 In % of Sub-
Case Study 
Group No. In % 
 
No. In % Country 
 
  
Canada 1  6,7% 1 100%  0 0% 
China 4  26,7% 0 0%  4 100% 
France 3  20,0% 3 100%  0 0% 
Germany 1  6,7% 1 100%  0 0% 
Italy 1  6,7% 1 100%  0 0% 
Netherlands 1  6,7% 1 100%  0 0% 
Switzerland 2  13,3% 1 50%  1 50% 
United Kingdom 2  13,3% 2 100%  0 0% 
Total 15  100,0% 10 66,7%   5 33,3% 
 
Table 3 above illustrates a breakdown of the sub-case study group by country. These are a 
group of G-SIBS that are eligible to reclassify financial assets under IAS 39 and have available 
information. With a total of 15 G-SIBs, China exhibits the largest number of the sub-case study 
group (26.7%). The table further documents an interesting observation that all banks in China 
did not reclassify financial assets in accordance with IAS 39 amendment. All other banks in 
other countries adopted and used the reclassification amendment, save for Swiss banks 
wherein one (1) bank used the reclassification dispensation while the other bank did not 
reclassify financial assets. This brings the total number of G-SIBs that did not reclassify 
financial assets pursuant to the amendment to 5. These G-SIBs stated in their annual reports 
that they have adopted the amendments to IAS 39, but there were no reclassifications of 
financial assets done during the period under review, save for Bank of China and China 
Construction Bank, which reclassified  assets within the previously permitted categories (from 
AFS into HTM).  The study speculate that the G-SIBs that did not reclassify in accordance with 
the revised IAS 39 had less trading assets (which were the most affected type of assets) in 
their balance sheets and hence, the effects of the financial crisis were not as strong on them 
as on other G-SIBs that had substantial amounts of trading assets. The other reason could be 
that the adoption of the reclassification options would have not made any significant 







amendment to IAS 39 which forms the focus of this study, while 33.3% of the G-SIBs did not 
apply the amendment. 
 
Table 4 below illustrates the group of G-SIBs that comprises the final case study units of 
analysis by country; 
 
Table 4: Case Study Units of Analysis 
BANK REPORTING BASIS HEADQUARTERS Continent 
Barclays PLC IFRS London, United Kingdom Europe 
BNP Paribas IFRS Paris, France Europe 
Deutsche Bank IFRS Frankfurt, Germany Europe 
Groupe BPCE IFRS Paris, France Europe 
Groupe Credit Agricole IFRS Montrouge, France Europe 
ING Bank IFRS Amsterdam, Netherlands Europe 
Stanchart IFRS London, United Kingdom Europe 
UBS IFRS Zurish, Switzerland Europe 
Unicredit Group IFRS Milan, Italy Europe 
Royal Bank of Canada CANADIAN-GAAP Toronto, Canada North America 
 
3.3 Data Collection 
 
The study utilises secondary data sourced from annual reports and financial statements of 
the G-SIBs. The annual reports were sourced from the banks’ official websites. For those years 
that the annual reports were not available on the websites, the annual reports were 
downloaded from Bloomberg. 
 
Data about reclassifications choices and relevant disclosures was manually obtained from the 
annual reports and notes to the banks’ annual financial statements to establish if a bank 
reclassified its financial assets under the October 13, 2008 IAS 39 amendment. The keyword 
“RECLASS” was used to search for data related to reclassifications under IAS 39 while 
“RESTATE” was used to search for data associated with restatements in the banks’ annual 







the respective banks’ annual reports. It was discovered that Bloomberg data does not update 
banks restated figures.  
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
 
To achieve the first two objectives of the study, the reclassifications are categorised into three 
main groups. The first group is the reclassifications from HFT to LAR/HTM category which 
affects both the net income and equity since fair value gains and losses stop being recognised 
in profit or loss and hence in equity. The other category is the reclassifications from HFT to 
AFS category which affects the net income only, but not equity because fair value gains and 
losses are still considered in the revaluation reserves as part of shareholders equity but are 
now reported in other comprehensive income (OCI) and not the income statement. The last 
group comprises of reclassifications from AFS to LAR category which affects other 
comprehensive income because assets cease being measured at fair value through other 
comprehensive income but at amortised cost. Once the categorisation is completed, it allows 
for grouping the reclassifications into those that happened during the allowed period and 
those outside the allowed period. 
 
The third objective which is finding out if the G-SIBs applied the restatement option to 
reclassify into and out of the prohibited category (the designated as at fair value category), 
will be achieved by categorising the different types of restatements that occurred from 2008 
to 2017 into groups. Once these are classified into respective categories, the study only deals 
with restatements that circumvent the prohibition to reclassify into and out the designated 
as at fair value category.  
 
To analyse the impact of the reclassifications, which is the fourth and last research objective, 
the study focuses on the impact on two main ratios in the banking industry, the return on 
equity (ROE) and total capital. The bank business model following risk management and 
regulatory approaches to bank capital, crystallised ROE as the main performance metric in 







measure of bank performance but it also drives the allocation of resources across and within 
bank divisions. In addition, ROE is an important profitability ratio that indicates how 
successfully banks maintain their profitability (Erina and Lace, 2013) as it demonstrates the 
bank’s efficiency at generating earnings using the available shareholders equity, making it an 
important ratio for potential investors.  
 
The banks’ capital ratio is also another important ratio in commercial banks, even though 
higher capital is believed to be costly for banks because it reduces profitability (Berger, 1995; 
Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2004). The “trade-off” theory, however, suggests that higher 
capital may also reduce a bank’s risk and therefore, the premium required to compensate 
investors for the bankruptcy costs (Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan, 1996; Hellmann, 
Murdoch and Stiglitz, 2000). Traditional corporate finance theories suggest that a bank in 
equilibrium desires to hold what it internally deems optimal level of capital, that is, the level 
of capital that trades off costs and benefits. However, Buser, Andrew and Edward, (1981) and 
Miller (1995) posit that banks may be forced to hold capital in excess of their internal optimal 
due to some capital requirements imposed by regulators.  The banks optimal capital ratios, 
however, vary over the financial cycle, they rise during periods of higher expected costs of 
distress (Berger, 1995). In his study, Berger (1995) concludes that during times of distress the 
relationship between capital and profitability is likely to be cyclical, becoming positive 
because adequately capitalised banks tend to have lower bankruptcy costs, which lowers the 
cost of capital and hence, increasing the profitability. As a result, good capital ratios and 
improved profitability reassures investors about the future existence of the bank.  
 
Different from Fiechter (2011) who pursued return on assets (ROA) in his analysis, this study 
does not pursue ROA. While ROA is another good measure of performance and profitability, 
it does not reflect the impact of capital structure decisions or financial leverage on the entity’s 
earnings. Another major shortcoming of ROA ratio is that it makes it difficult to compare 
entities with different asset structures. Therefore, the study prefers using the ROE over ROA 
because of the asset independency of ROE, which enables a comparison of banks with 







something that is impossible with ROA. It is for these reasons that the study focuses on ROE 
and total capital to assess how the reclassifications impacted the performance  of G-SIBs that 
applied the amendment to IAS 39, more so that the amendment was introduced to alleviate 
the impacts of FVA during a distressed period. 
 
To analyse the effects of the reclassification options on the financial statements, the reported 
figures are compared against calculated pre-reclassification figures. To determine 
performance-related pre-reclassification figures, the change in net profit due to 
reclassifications from HFT into LAR and HFT into AFS is deducted from the reported net profit. 
In order to calculate the pre-reclassification net profit, the following steps are followed;  
 
(a) Fair value is subtracted from the carrying value of the reclassified assets to see how 
much loss or gain would have been recognised had the bank continued using the fair 
value method to value the assets. The carrying value is the reported value of the assets 
as stated in the annual financial statements. The difference between the two values 
provides an indication of how much loss was avoided by adopting the IAS 39 
reclassification amendment or how much gain the bank had forgone by reclassifying 
financial assets. A positive value indicates that a profit has actually been realised from 
reclassifying financial assets. Said differently, it indicates the amount of loss avoided 
by adopting the reclassification amendment.  
 
(b) The difference in these two values is then reduced by the effective tax rate to get the 
after-tax total change in net profit due to reclassifications. The after-tax total change 
in net profit due to reclassifications is basically the true net profit (loss) forgone 
(avoided) when assets were reclassified in accordance with the amended IAS 39.  
 
(c) The after-tax total change in net profit due to reclassifications is then deducted from 
the reported net profit to restate the reported net profit to what it could have been 
had there been no reclassifications. The calculation of the pre-reclassification net 







comparison with the reported ROE to analyse the performance of banks before and 
after reclassifications of financial assets. 
  
To calculate capital-related pre-reclassification figures, the change in net income due to 
reclassifications from HFT to LAR are deducted from the reported total regulatory capital as 
well as changes in other comprehensive income (OCI) due to reclassifications from AFS to LAR, 
because both these reclassifications affect the value of equity. However, change in net 
income due to reclassifications from HFT to AFS are not deducted from total regulatory capital 
since the kind of reclassification does not affect the equity because any fair value gains and 
losses from AFS revaluation reserves do not count as part of regulatory capital in terms of 
Basel 2 Accord.  
 
Since majority of the G-SIBs under the scope of this study report in Euros, the monetary values 
of the four G-SIBs (Barclays, Stanchart, Royal Bank of Canada and UBS) that report in other 
currencies are converted to Euros for uniformity and comparability purposes using the 
exchange rates obtained from Bloomberg. Exchange rates on the date of reclassification are 
used to calculate amount of assets reclassified. For those banks where the reclassification 
date is not specifically stated but alluded to have occurred during a certain quarter, the 
exchange rate of the last day of the quarter is used. The reported net income is converted 
using the average exchange rate of the year while the change in net income and other 
comprehensive income due to reclassification are converted to Euros using the average 
exchange rate of the period from the reclassification date to December 31st of the year of 
reclassification or the financial year-end of the respective G-SIB (e.g., RBC whose financial 
year-end is October 31st). However, for the years where there is no reclassification the 
average exchange rate for the year is used. Balance sheet figures such as the book value of 
equity are converted using the exchange rate as at December 31st of each year or as at the 








4. Results of the Study 
 
This section presents the results of the study. The purpose is to explore the three possible 
ways in which G-SIBs can apply the reclassification choices, being the application of IAS 39 
amendment during the allowed period, beyond the allowed period and the application of 
restatements to the previously reclassified financial assets. In addition, the study also intends 
to find out the long-term effects of the reclassifications, particularly on the net income, ROE 
and total regulatory capital. The outcome will assist in determining if G-SIBs adopted the IAS 
39 as an opportunistic tool for managing earnings and regulatory capital. 
 
4.1 Analysis of the Reclassification Time 
 
For periods between July 1 and October 31, 2008, entities were allowed to reclassify financial 
assets retrospectively to any date during the period. Banks that reclassified assets prior to 
November 1, 2008 could backdate to any date between July 1 and October 31, 2008. 
However, after November 1, 2008, any reclassification took place from the date on which they 
occurred, implying that after this period reclassifications can only be done prospectively.  
 
The data indicates that out of 10 G-SIBS that form the group of analysis of this study, majority 
(80 percent) of G-SIBS used both options of reclassifications, the retrospective and 
prospective, except the 10 percent of the banks that decided to reclassify retrospectively 
while the other 10 percent applied the prospective reclassifications. One G-SIB retrospectively 
reclassified financial assets on July 1, 2008, while another one prospectively reclassified 
financial assets in December and first quarter of 2009. Table 5 and 6 below illustrate the G-












Table 6: Prospective Reclassifications by the G-SIBs 
 
*Specific dates not disclosed 
 
The tables indicate the dates of reclassifications with the exception of Groupe Credit Agricole 
which had not explicitly stated some dates on which it reclassified the assets in the financial 













Royal Bank of Canada 01-Aug-08 and 01-Oct-08
RETROSPECTIVE RECLASSIFICATIONS
Bank Reclassification Date
Barclays 16-Dec-09 and 25-Nov-09
BNP 30-Jun-09 and 30-Jun-11
Deutche 31-Mar-09
Groupe Credit Agricole* 2010, 2011, 30-Jun-14, 16-Dec-14 and Dec 15
Groupe BPCE 31-Dec-08
ING 12-Jan-09 and Q2, 2009
UBS 31-Dec-08 and Q1, 2009
Unicredit 31-Mar-09








4.2 Analysis of Reclassifications 
 
The study examined in detail the reclassifications made by the G-SIBs. Basically, there are 4 
types of reclassifications that can be applied by banks under the IAS 39, which are, HFT into 
LAR/HTM; HFT into AFS, AFS into LAR; and AFS into HTM. However, prior to the revision of 
IAS 39, only one reclassification, particularly the reclassification from the AFS securities into 
HTM was permitted. Therefore, for the purpose of this study only three reclassifications which 
were not previously allowed are examined.  
 




Table 7 above provides the type of reclassifications adopted by the different G-SIBs over the 
period under review. It demonstrates that, the G-SIBs utilised all the three types of 
reclassifications. However, some banks adopted only one type of the reclassification while 
others adopted more than one or all the three types. An exploration of the reclassifications 
reveals that majority of G-SIBs, 40 percent made only one type of reclassification. Of this 40 
percent, 30 percent comprises banks that reclassified from HFT into LAR/HTM while 10 
percent reclassified from AFS securities into LAR. 30 percent of G-SIBs used all the three types 
of reclassifications. The remaining 30 percent used two types of reclassifications, where 20 
percent used the option to reclassify from HFT into LAR and AFS into LAR whereas 10 percent 
reclassified from HFT into AFS and AFS into LAR. None of the banks adopted reclassifications 
from HFT into AFS only nor a combination of reclassifications from HFT into LAR and HFT into 
AFS. 
Type of Reclassification G-SIBs Number of Banks
HFT into LAR/HTM only Barclays, Deutche and UBS 3
HFT into AFS only - -
AFS into LAR only ING 1
HFT into LAR and HFT into AFS AFS - -
HFT into LAR and AFS into LAR Groupe Credit Agricole and Groupe BPCE 2
HFT into AFS and AFS into LAR Royal Bank of Canada 1







Table 8: Summary of the Types of Reclassifications that Occurred from 2008 to 2017 
 
 
Exploring the total number of reclassifications that occurred during the period under review 
illustrates that a total of 35 reclassifications with a total carrying value of € 208 387 million 
took place between 2008 and 2017 as illustrated in Table 8 above. The most common type 
was the reclassification of trading securities into loan and receivables which registered 20 
reclassifications (57.14 percent) with a carrying value of € 140 795 million, followed by 
reclassifications from AFS into LAR at 28.57 percent and carrying value of € 49 555 million 
while the remaining 14.29 percent were the reclassifications from HFT into AFS securities with 
carrying value of € 18 037 million. It should be noted that some G-SIBs may have the same 
type of reclassification occurring more than once in the same year or in different years. An 
interesting observation was with Groupe Credit Agricole which had a total of eight 
reclassifications over the 10-year period, seven of which were reclassifications of trading 
securities into loans and receivables while one was from available for sale securities into loans 
and receivables. 
 
The average carrying value of financial assets reclassified year-on-year is provided on Table 9 
below. An average of € 20 839 million financial assets was reclassified during the period under 
review. The table illustrates that reclassifications were prominent during the financial crisis, 
that is in 2008 and 2009 as the table illustrates that an average of € 13 058 million and € 6 
203 million were reclassified in these two years, respectively. The two years accounted for an 
average of 92.43 percent of the average assets reclassified during the 10-year period. A 
massive decline of assets reclassified was observed in 2010 were an average of € 8 million 
financial assets were reclassified. The reclassifications after 2009 are regarded as those 
conducted outside the allowed period because the amendment to IAS 39 was meant to be 
HFT to LAR/HTM 140 795                            20 57,14%
HFT to AFS 18 037                              5 14,29%
AFS to LAR 49 555                              10 28,57%
TOTAL 208 387                            35 100,00%
Total Carrying Value 










used for a short period following which the IASB progressively introduced IFRS 9 as a 
replacement standard. Despite this, the table reveals that some G-SIBs continued to reclassify 
assets beyond 2009, more of which were reclassified in 2011 (€ 911 million) and 2015 (€ 616 
million).  
 
Table 9: Average Assets Reclassified from 2008 to 2017 
 
 
4.3 Reclassifications within the Allowed Period 
 
Table 10: Classification of Reclassifications into the allowed and Unallowed Period 
 
 
Seven out of ten G-SIBs reclassified financial assets within the allowed period only, between 
2008 (between 1 July and December 31) and 2009 as illustrated by Table 10 above. This forms 
the majority of the sample, i.e., 70 percent of the G-SIBs. Five G-SIBs out of the seven that 
reclassified within the allowed period reclassified both in 2008 and 2009 while two 
reclassified assets during the first year of the amendment of IAS 39 only, that is, between 1 
July and 31 December 2008. Of the 35 reclassifications (reported in Table 8) that occurred 
Type of Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
HFT into LAR/HTM 10 870    3 179       8               17            -           -           2               2               1               -           14 079    
HFT into AFS 1 529       12            -           263          -           -           -           -           -           -           1 804       
AFS into LAR 659          3 012       -           631          -           -           40            614          -           -           4 956       
TOTAL 13 058    6 203       8               911          -           -           42            616          1               -           20 839    
AVERAGE ASSETS RECLASSIFIED




Groupe Agricole 2 6














over the 10-year period, 26 reclassifications were within the allowed period while 9 where 
outside the allowed period as illustrated in Table 10. Within the allowed period, 15 
reclassifications were from the HFT into LAR (57.69 percent), 8 from the AFS into the LAR 
(30.77 percent) and 4 were from HFT into AFS (15.38 percent). 
 
4.4 Reclassifications beyond the Allowed Period 
 
Table 11 below illustrates the three G-SIBs that extended the use of the IAS 39 to a period 
beyond 2009 despite the continuous introduction of the IFRS 9 which was meant to replace 
IAS 39. These three banks are, BNP Paribus which reclassified financial assets in 2008, 2009 
and 2011, Groupe Credit Agricole which reclassified assets in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014, 
2015 and 2016, while the Royal Bank of Canada reclassified assets in 2008, 2011 and 2015. 
 
The total carrying value of the financial assets reclassified outside the allowed period is € 
15 778 million, accounting for 7.57 percent of total reclassified assets. It consists of € 300 
million reclassifications from HFT into LAR, € 2 632 million reclassified from HFT into AFS and 
€ 12 846 million reclassified from AFS into LAR. A bulk of assets reclassified outside the 
allowed period were in respect of AFS securities reclassified into LAR as highlighted by the 
figure enclosed in the blue oval in Table 11 below, comprising 81.42 percent of all assets 
reclassified beyond the allowed period. Interestingly, a large amount of the assets reclassified 
in this category were reclassified by BNP Paribus (49.14 percent) and Royal Bank of Canada 











An interesting observation was that, unlike the trend that was observed of trading assets 
forming the bulk of assets that were reclassified into LAR during the allowed period, 
reclassifications that occurred beyond 2009 demonstrate a different trajectory. Tables 11 
above illustrates that G-SIBs reclassified more available-for-sale securities into the loans and 
receivables category (€ 12 846 million) followed by reclassifications of trading assets into AFS 
securities with a carrying value of € 2 632 million.  On average, € 1 285 million of trading assets 
were reclassified into AFS and € 263 million was reclassified from trading assets into the AFS 
securities as highlighted by the figures enclosed in the red and blue ovals, respectively, in 
Table 9.  
 
4.5 The Impact of the reclassifications 
 
The majority of reclassifications were out of the trading category into LAR/HTM category 
which affects the net income.  The average amount of reclassified financial assets over the 
period under review in respect of the average total assets prior to reclassification is 0.15 
percent while the average in terms of the average book value before reclassification is 4.66 
percent as reported in Table 12 below. Compared to Fiechter (2011:63)’s results (3.9 percent 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 TOTAL
BNP Paribus
AFS to LAR -                   6 312              -                                                     -              -              -              -              6 312       
Groupe Credit Agricole
HFT into LAR 76                    169                 -                                                     -              24               22               9                  300          
AFS into LAR -                   -                  -                                                     -              398             -              -              398          
Royal Bank of Canada
HFT into AFS -                   2 632              -                                                     -              -              -              -              2 632       
AFS into LAR -                   -                  -                                                     -              -              6 136          -              6 136       
AGGREGATE
HFT into LAR 76                    169                 -                                                     -              24               22               9                  300          
HFT into AFS -                   2 632              -                                                     -              -              -              -              2 632       
AFS into LAR -                   6 312              -                                                     -              398             6 136          -              12 846    
TOTAL 76                    9 113              -                                                     -              422             6 158          9                  15 778    







and 131 percent, respectively), G-SIBs reclassifications were not very extensive. Despite this, 
the results demonstrate that the reclassifications were extensive in the early period of the 
introduction of the amendment to IAS 39 (between 1 July and 31 December 2008 and 2009). 
Table 12 illustrates an average amount of reclassified financial assets in respect of the average 
total assets prior to reclassification of 0.88 and 0.47 percent in 2008 and 2009 respectively, 
whereas the average amount in terms of the average book value before reclassification was 
29.59 percent and 15.04 percent, respectively. The years beyond 2009 demonstrate quite 
insignificant results. 
 
This study is mainly interested in the fair value losses that could have been recognised had 
the respective reclassifications not occurred. In the case of reclassifications of HFT securities, 
potential write-downs were avoided from resulting through profit or loss account whereas 
reclassifications of AFS securities barred write-downs from resulting in other comprehensive 
income. The total average change in net income and other comprehensive income illustrate 
a downward trajectory suggesting that large changes were experienced during the crisis 
period and thus, the amendment like IASB indicated, mostly provided some kind of relieve to 
the banks during times of economic downturns. Table 12 reports that between 1 July 2008 
and 31 December 2008, G-SIBs were able to avoid an average fair value loss of € 1 038 million 
from occurring in the profit or loss account, representing an average of 5.02 percent of the 
2008 reported net income. 
 
In 2009 the average fair value losses avoided declined by 38.54 percent to € 638 million and 
Table 12 also illustrates a decline in the financial assets reclassified. The average fair value 
losses avoided in 2009 expressed in terms of the average reported net income for 2009 
reported very strange results, a -224.81 percent. Basically, the average reported net income 
increased by 52.42 percent from what it could have been had there been no reclassification 
(Reported on Table 12 and the figure highlighted in red oval). These uncommon results were 
traceable to Groupe BPCE. The bank was able to prevent fair value losses amounting to € 1 







reclassified, it could have reported a net loss of € 1 832 million, but instead it reported a net 







Table 12: The Average Impacts of Reclassifications from 2008 to 2017 
  
 Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Average Reclassification 13 058    6 203       8               911          -           -           42            616          1               -           20 839     
HFT into LAR/HTM 10 870    3 179       8               17            -           -           2               2               1               -           14 079     
HFT into AFS 1 529       12            -           263          -           -           -           -           -           -           1 804        
AFS into LAR 659          3 012       -           631          -           -           40            614          -           -           4 956        
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Total Assets 0,88% 0,47% 0,00% 0,06% -           -           0,00% 0,04% 0,00         -           0,15%
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Book value of Equity 29,59% 15,04% 0,01% 1,23% -           -           0,08% 0,67% 0,00         -           4,66%
Average Change in Net Income 1 038       638          236          395          352          60            25            55            27            37-            2 789        
HFT into LAR/HTM 1 038       638          236          395          352          60            25            55            27            37-            2 789        
HFT into AFS -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -            
Average Change in OCI
AFS into LAR 45 6 49 155 16 -9 -54 -10 -10 -8 181
Total Change in Net Income 1 038       638          236          395          352          60            25            55            27            37-            2 789        
Total Change in Equity 1 079       644          280          534          366          52            24-            46            18            45-            2 952        
Average Reported Net Income 5 294-       1 856       5 303       4 945       1 024       1 759       2 619       3 183       1 928       2 959       
Average Reported Regulatory Capital 45 807    47 388    56 385    56 406    54 975    57 453    59 712    62 131    66 086    67 653    
Average Reported Return on Equity -10,42% 3,62% 9,57% 8,66% 0,95% 2,34% 4,53% 4,90% 1,81% 4,65%
Average Pre-reclassification Net Income 6 333-       1 218       5 067       4 550       672          1 699       2 594       3 129       1 901       2 996       
Average Pre-reclassification Total Regulatory Capital 44 728    46 744    56 105    55 871    54 609    57 402    59 736    62 086    66 067    67 697    
Average Pre-reclassification Return on Equity -12,93% 2,53% 8,98% 7,89% 0,41% 2,17% 4,11% 4,46% 1,56% 4,26%
Average change in net income in terms of reported Net Income 5,02% -224,81% 11,55% 7,12% 29,27% 2,81% -0,13% -0,29% 4,47% 3,76%
Average change in OCI in terms of reported regulatory Capital 2,17% 1,46% 0,57% 1,03% 0,70% 0,11% -0,04% 0,08% 0,01% -0,06%
Increase/Decrease in Reported income as a result of reclassification 16,40% 52,42% 4,66% 8,69% 52,39% 3,52% 0,95% 1,75% 1,43% -1,25%




Over the period under review, it is evident that the reclassifications assisted with improving 
the reported net income as illustrated by an increase in the net income as a result of 
reclassifying the financial instruments, except for just one year in 2017 were there was a slight 
deterioration of 1.25 person in the average reported net income. Between 1 July and 31 
December 2008, the net income increased by 16.40 percent from what it could have been if 
there was no reclassification. This trend followed through the 10 years, with two surprisingly 
large increases experienced in 2009 and 2012 highlighted in figures enclosed in red and purple 
ovals in Table 12 above. The 2009 large increase was attributable to the large amount of losses 
avoided by Groupe BPCE while the 2012 impressive results were attributable to the Deutsche 
and Unicredit banks. Through reclassifying, Deutsche bank avoided reporting a net income of 
just € 37 million and instead recorded a net income of € 316 million, which is an improvement 
in net income of 756.74 percent as illustrated by the figures enclosed in orange ovals in Table 
14 on Appendix 1. Similarly, Unicredit would have reported a net loss of € 515 million but 
instead recorded a net income of € 1 223 million, representing a 337.48 percent improvement 
in reported net income as illustrated by figures enclosed in green ovals in Table 14 on 
Appendix 1. 
 
While a total average change in net income of € 2 789 million resulted from reclassifications 
of trading securities over a period of 10 years, the total average effect on other 
comprehensive income amounted to € 181 million due to reclassifications of AFS securities 
into the LAR category (Reported in Table 11). The average total change in regulatory capital 
amounted to € 2 952 million which is made up of the average change in net income due to 
reclassifications of trading assets into loans and receivables category as well as average 
change in OCI resulting from reclassifications of AFS securities into loans and receivables. The 
gains or losses resulting from reclassifications of trading assets into the available-for-sale 
securities do not affect equity since Basel 2 Accords stipulates that any equities that resulted 
from the revaluation of AFS securities do not qualify to be counted as regulatory capital. 
Therefore, the gains or losses resulting from the reclassification option only affect the net 
income but are excluded from equity. An analysis of all the G-SIBs that reclassified using this 
option, however, illustrates that no gains or losses were incurred as a result of reclassifying 
trading assets into AFS securities, as indicated by the average change in net income due to 
reclassifications from HFT into AFS in Table 12 above. On average, a slight improvement is 
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revealed on reported total regulatory capital with the largest increase of 2.41 percent 
registered between 1 July and 31 December 2008. The improved total capital increased at a 
decreasing rate and it was not as significant as the improved net income.  
 
Comparing the pre-reclassification ROE against the reported ROE, a slight improvement was 
observed as well, especially in the first two years just like other variables. On average, G-SIBs 
would have reported an average ROE of -12.93 percent but following reclassifications, the 
ROE was improved to -10.42 percent. The margin on improved average reported ROE 
however, narrows from 2013 onwards. This is attributable to the slight improvement in the 
average reported regulatory capital. Taken together, these results indicate that the G-SIBs’ 
concern was not mainly the regulatory capital but to improve reported earnings, especially 
during the crisis period. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the long run, the impact of 
reclassifications on the G-SIBs` ROE and regulatory capital were insignificant and thus G-SIBs 
did not reap much long-term benefits from the reclassifications. The benefits were only short-
lived, during the crisis period. 
 
4.6 Restatements of Reclassifications 
 
In this section, the purpose is to explore the financial statements of the G-SIBs and find out if 
G-SIBs, like other non-G-SIBs used the option of restating figures of previously reclassified 
assets in order to reclassify assets in and out of the prohibited asset category, the designated 
as at fair value category. Prior to the amendment of IAS 39, all reclassifications in and out of 
the fair value options were prohibited, and even after the amendment of 2008 the IASB still 
prohibited reclassifications of assets that have been designated as at fair value upon initial 
recognition. If upon initial recognition a bank designated some securities as measured at fair 
value, such securities shall remain in that category and cannot be reclassified out of this 
category into any other category under any circumstances unless they are derecognised. The 
same applied to assets that were previously measured under other categories (AFS, HTM, 




The objective was motivated by De Jager (2010:134)’s results wherein he found some 
commercial bank, particularly SBoSA restating some comparative figures in order to get 
around the prohibition on reclassifications into and out of the ‘designated as at fair value’ 
category. His results illustrate that had SBoSA not restated the figures that were believed to 
have been erroneously reclassified in the prior years, there would have been a massive drop 
in the bank’s deposits from customers. Therefore, this study explored the financial 
statements of the G-SIBs to track for the same use of restatements of the comparative figures. 
However, the results in Table 13 below illustrate that G-SIBs did not use such type of 
restatement to reclassify financial assets.   
 
Table 13: The Types of Restatements Made by G-SIBs Between 2008 and 2017 
 
 
Table 13 above illustrates a summary of the different types of restatements observed from 
the G-SIBs financial statements. It illustrates that the most common type of restatement that 
was adopted by all G-SIBs was when there was an introduction of a new accounting standard 
or the existing standard was reviewed. During the period under review such standards that 
were introduced while others were reviewed included among others, IFRS 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
15 and 19 as well as IAS 28, 29, 32, 36 and 39. This type of restatement was followed by 70 
percent of G-SIBs restating previously disclosed information about the operating segments, 
products and services, the geographical areas in which the banks operate and the major 
customers of the banks in accordance with IFRS 8 – Operating Segments. 
 
Types of Restatements Number of Banks Percent
First time adoption or revision of accounting standards 10 100%
Ommissions and corrections of errors 3 30%
Change in classification of items 5 50%
Restating previous reclassifications 0 0%
Restating compensation packages of Management 1 10%
Restatement due to rights Issue 1 10%
Redefination of financial statement items 2 20%
To reflect change in accounting treatment of cross border exposure 1 10%
Mergers and/or acquisitions 3 30%
Change in reporting currency 1 10%
Merging of business units/operations and organisation restructuring 4 40%
Sale non-current assets being and discontinued operations 4 40%
Restatement of previously disclosed information about operating segments, products and services 7 70%
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Since there were no restatements of reclassifications observed in G-SIBs the impacts of such 
restatements on the banks’ net income, ROE and total capital could not be assessed. It can 
therefore, be concluded that G-SIBs did not use provisions of other existing accounting 
standards to get around the requirements of IAS 39, particularly to circumvent the prohibition 
to reclassify into and out of the designated as at fair value category. Apart from SBoSA, such 
behaviour was also observed in Nedbank Group where restatement occurred in which AFS 
securities were reclassified to the designated as at fair value category in 2009. In 2017 
financial assets were also reclassified from LAR into designated as at fair value category and 
vice versa. Both reclassifications were made using the restatement option under the claim 
that these financial assets were erroneously classified upon initial recognition and hence were 
corrected in accordance with IAS 8. 
 
In summary, the G-SIBs utilised both the retrospective and prospective forms of reclassifying 
financial assets and all the three types of reclassifications were used with majority of trading 
assets reclassified into loans and receivable category. 70 percent of banks reclassified within 
the allowed period which comprised of a bulk of assets reclassified during the period under 
review. The remaining 30 percent reclassified beyond 2009 with most of the AFS securities 
reclassified into LAR followed by trading assets reclassified into AFS securities unlike the trend 
observed under the allowed period. In terms of the effects of reclassifications, the results 
illustrated a great improvement on reported net income with a slight improvement on the 
regulatory capital and return on equity. However, the effects of the reclassifications were 
more prominent during the first two years of the amendment of IAS 39 with insignificant 
results beyond the period or in the long-term. 
 
5. Discussion of Results 
 
A case study type of research is often criticised for its lack of ability to generalise the results 
beyond the cases studied. However, the correct way of generalising the results of a case study 
is through the ability to develop a theory out of the results or linking the results to the already 
existing theory. This study also used a comparative or multiple case study approach to 




The results of the cases studied are consistent with the theoretical expectations that the IAS 
39 amendment provided a tool that could be used for earnings and capital management. 
Table 5 and 6 illustrating the options used by the G-SIBs to reclassify financial assets either 
retrospectively or prospectively provides some evidence that G-SIBs’ motive was to improve 
either earnings or regulatory capital figures. Considering that within the allowed period of 
reclassifications, there were 26 reclassifications that occurred, 15 of which were retrospective 
reclassifications indicates a motive behind the adoption of this form of reclassification. 
Retrospective reclassification enables banks to choose the assets for and date of 
reclassification based on the knowledge of the subsequent price performance. Simply, 
retrospective reclassifications provided a look-back option to the G-SIBs which enabled them 
to assess the fair value losses they were likely to incur when using the fair value method and 
determined how to prevent these losses by reclassifying to amortised cost at a specific date 
with known performance prices. Such an option allows for banks to avoid substantial losses 
and also to remedy the deteriorated earnings and capital figures. This explains why most 
reclassifications and in substantial amounts were carried out within the allowed period so 
that banks could utilise the option to choose a reclassification date that could alleviate 
substantial fair value losses, thereby improving their earnings that were deteriorated by the 
financial crisis.  
 
In terms of the ability to choose the types of assets to reclassify based on knowledge of price 
performance, evidence illustrates that during the allowed period of reclassifications, which is 
the period around the financial crisis, substantial amounts of trading assets were reclassified 
compared to assets from other categories. Basically, trading assets were the most affected 
type of assets during the crisis for the simple reason that gains, or losses realised by the 
trading securities affect the net income. As a result, it makes more sense to prevent write-
downs that affect the net income (hence, earnings) by shifting such securities to a category 
that values them at historical cost. It should be noted that earnings deterioration also affects 
capital as earnings are the best sources of income, hence, a deterioration in earnings results 
in a deterioration in capital also. Therefore, in a way, the type of this reclassification 
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(especially from HFT into LAR) killed two birds with one stone, as it improved both the 
earnings and equity, hence regulatory capital. 
 
Evidence on Table 12 demonstrates that despite signs of earnings and capital management, 
earnings management was more prominent than capital management especially during the 
first two years of the introduction of the amendment. The results however, illustrated two 
outliers in 2009 and 2012 where there was a greater than normal improvement on the 
average reported net income during these two years. As alluded on the discussions below 
Table 12, these were attributable to Groupe BPCE in 2009 and the Deutsche and Unicredit 
bank in 2012, all of which realised substantial gains on the net income following 
reclassifications as illustrated under each respective bank in Table 14 on the Appendix. The 
individual G-SIBs provided on Table 14 also illustrates short-lived earnings management 
practice. 
 
Beyond the allowed period of reclassifications, evidence presented indicated that more AFS 
securities were reclassified into LAR followed by the reclassifications from HFT into AFS 
securities. It can be argued that these two types of reclassifications are the types to be used 
to improve the equity of the banks. A reclassification from AFS securities into LAR prevent 
write-downs from being recognised in OCI, therefore, any fair value losses in the AFS reserves 
is transferred away from the OCI and hence, equity. Since the unrealised gains and losses 
recognised in AFS securities do not form part of regulatory capital in terms of Basel 2, a 
reclassification from HFT into AFS could be argued to be a way of shifting the losses to AFS 
reserves which are shielded from impacting capital negatively. The results on Table 12 
however, do not support this argument except in 2011 and 2012 where a 0.96 and 0.67 
percent improvement on reported regulatory capital were recorded, respectively. These 
results further illustrate that the reclassifications in accordance with the amended IAS 39 
were not motivated by capital management motives but rather, earnings management. 
 
Lastly, the study also established if G-SIBs used the option to restate figures of previously 
reclassified financial assets to circumvent the requirement on IAS 39 that prohibits the 
reclassification into and out of the designated as at fair value category. The results illustrate 
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that unlike the non-G-SIB SBoSA and Nedbank, systemic banks did not apply the technique. 
IAS 39 provides that once a financial instrument, on initial recognition is designated, the 
instrument cannot be reclassified out of this category and financial instruments that were 
initially measured under other categories cannot be reclassified into this category as well. The 
reason often provided for designating financial assets or liabilities upon initial recognition is 
that it eliminates or significantly reduces some accounting mismatch arising from measuring 
the instruments or recognising the gains and losses on such instruments on different bases 
(KPMG, nd:6). Restatements of comparative figures by nature provide entities with a look-
back option. An entity can look at its figures and determine whether restating would benefit 
it to carry an instrument at either fair value or amortised cost. This technique is, however, 
currently not a worrisome issue because the introduction of IFRS 9 which requires financial 
instruments to be classified into only two categories depending  on the entity’s business 
model for managing the instrument and the instrument’s contractual cashflows. 
 
To conclude the discussion section, a linkage of the results to the theory illustrates that 
earnings management was more prominent in these reclassifications by G-SIBs, particularly 
during the allowed period of the reclassifications, in accordance with IAS 39. Slight capital 
management was observed during the financial crisis period. Therefore, it can also be 
concluded that the impacts of the 2008/2009 reclassifications on the G-SIBs were short-lived 
in terms of both earnings and capital management. 
 
6. Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research and 
Conclusion  
 
6.1 Limitations of the Study  
 
The research study is subject to some caveats. The first limitation observable is that the 
sample of the study is limited as it focused on only large banks. Therefore, the results of the 
study cannot speak for all banks and should be interpreted with caution. The focus on a 
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limited sample of  large banks or G-SIBs, however, is because their larger holdings of riskier 
assets highly exposed them to substantial fair value losses during the financial crisis than any 
other non-systemic bank. The results of the study also indicated that no G-SIBs restated 
previously reclassified financial assets and therefore, made it impossible to find any effects of 
such restatement. These results can, however, not be generalised for all banks because of the 
limited sample. A large sample may find that other banks other than the G-SIBs exhibited the 
same behaviour as SBoSA and Nedbank. Lastly, the results of the study adopted an aggregate 
focus, where the individual G-SIBs data was aggregated and averaged. The shortcoming with 
aggregating the data is depriving the results of the more detailed bank by bank analysis which 
could essentially be more insightful as individual banks possess unique characteristics. 
 
6.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Several issues associated with the topic of this research study may be considered for future 
research. The study revealed that some of the G-SIBs that were eligible to reclassify financial 
assets under IAS 39 chose not to reclassify in accordance with the amendment and, had 
explicitly stated so in their annual reports. Considering the importance of G-SIBs to the entire 
economy, possible future research could consider finding out the reaction of investors and 
analysts to this partial adoption and application of the amendment to IAS 39.  
 
Furthermore, when IASB introduced the amendment, part of the justifications for the 
amendment was to level the playing field for banks reporting under IFRS and those reporting 
under the US GAAP. Whether the objective has been achieved, and the extent to which banks 
that applied the amendment to IAS 39 benefitted compared to their counterparts who do not 
apply IFRS, remain to be determined. Therefore, an additional future research could focus on 
whether the application of the amendment to IAS 39 achieved the objectives of IASB and to 
what extent has the banks that applied the reclassifications amendment benefitted compared 
to their counterparts who do not apply IFRS. 
 
Finally, accounting rules for financial instruments changed with the introduction of IFRS 9, 
which basically narrowed down the four financial assets categories under IAS 39 into just two 
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categories; one measured at amortised cost and the other at fair value. The main objective of 
the standard is to eliminate or reduce accounting complexity in measuring financial 
instruments through forming a single set of regulations for the accounting of financial 
instruments. The new standard has been introduced in parts with the final mandatory 
application for annual periods beginning January 1, 2018.  Early adoption of the standard was 
also allowed. The introduction of this new standard, therefore, presents a great opportunity 
for future research in the accounting for financial instruments, to assess and analyse the 
impact this classification has on the net income and regulatory capital of commercial banks 
and whether there are any possible signs of earnings and regulatory capital management 




Following the political pressure from politicians and bankers on IASB to re-look the use of fair 
value accounting as a method for measuring the value of financial instruments, an 
amendment to IAS 39 was introduced on 13 October 2008 enabling banks to reclassify non-
derivative financial assets from the fair value option to historical cost. Consequently, entities 
are able to avoid substantial unrealised fair value losses on financial instruments. 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore how Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) 
applied the amendment to IAS 39 since 2008/2009. The study is guided by four main 
objectives in which the first two objectives explores how the G-SIBs applied the 
reclassifications  during the allowed period, 2008/2009 and the period beyond 2009 when the 
application of the standard should have been stopped, respectively. The study  further 
investigates if any G-SIBs used restatements to circumvent the requirements of the IAS 39 
that does not allow reclassifications into and out of the ‘designated as at fair value’ category. 
Finally, the study explores the impacts of the reclassifications on the G-SIBs’ ROE and total 
regulatory capital with the aim to find if G-SIBs reaped any long-term benefits from the 
reclassifications and whether any traces of earning and capital management exist in the way 
G-SIBs applied the amendment to IAS 39. 
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To achieve these objectives a comparative case study approach, which is qualitative in 
nature/scope was used with 10 G-SIBS forming part of the units of the analysis of the study. 
A comparative case-study approach was the most appropriate since the research question 
posed an exploratory type of question, but the study did not completely exclude the use of 
quantitative data. The study finds that the G-SIBs utilised both the retrospective and 
prospective forms of reclassifying financial assets and all the three types of reclassifications 
(HFT into LAR/HTM, HFT into AFS and AFS into LAR) were used with majority of trading assets 
reclassified into loans and receivable category. 70 percent of G-SIBs reclassified within the 
allowed period which comprised of the bulk of assets reclassified during the period under 
review. The remaining 30 percent that reclassified beyond 2009 was found to have 
reclassified more AFS securities into LAR followed by trading assets reclassified into AFS 
securities unlike the trend observed during the allowed period. The study further finds that 
G-SIBs did not use the concept of restating comparative figures to avoid the prohibition on 
reclassifications into and out of the ‘designated as at fair value category’ as found to have 
been used by other non-G-SIBs, particularly SBoSA, by De Jager (2010:134). In terms of the 
effects of reclassifications, the results illustrate a significant improvement on reported net 
income with a slight improvement on return on equity and regulatory capital. The impacts of 
the reclassifications are more prominent during the first two years of the amendment of IAS 
39 with insignificant benefits reaped by G-SIBs in the long run. The results, however, suggest 
that G-SIBs used the amendment to IAS 39 as a tool for earnings and capital management 
especially during the first two years of the introduction of the amendment. Even though 
beyond 2009 the results illustrate slight improvement in net income, it can be concluded that 
earnings management behaviour was more prominent than the capital management 
behaviour on G-SIBs during the period under review.  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature (Fiechter, 2011; Kholmy and Ernstberger, 
2010; Paananen et al, 2012; Quagli and Ricciardi) on the reclassification choices of commercial 
banks by exploring how the G-SIBs applied the IAS 39 amendment during the crisis, which has 
been lacking in the literature. The study also contributes to the existing literature on the 
impacts of the reclassification choices by exploring if there are any long-term benefits reaped 
by G-SIBs from the reclassifications. A growing body of literature have examined the effects 
of the IAS 39 reclassifications on commercial banks that adopted the amended IAS 39 during 
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the highly volatile period with no attention provided to the long-term impact of the 
reclassifications.   
 
Knowing the importance of G-SIBs to the economy, it may be relevant to find out the reaction 
of investors and analysts to the partial adoption of the reclassification amendment by the G-
SIBs, as a recommendation for future research. Moreover, the introduction of IFRS 9 presents 
a great opportunity for future research to assess and analyse the impact the new financial 
asset classification has on the net income and regulatory capital and whether there are any 
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Table 14: Summary of Reclassifications and their Impacts on Individual G-SIBs 
 
Barclays
 Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Reclassification 3 640       7 272              -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           10 912     
HFT into LAR/HTM 3 640       7 272              -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           10 912     
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
AFS into LAR -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Total Assets 0,19% 0,59% -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Book value of Equity 8,03% 14,03% -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
 Total Change in Net Income 2               34                   153          227          26            33            8               0-               11            13            
HFT into LAR/HTM 2               34                   153          227          26            33            8               0-               11            13            
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Average Change in OCI
AFS into LAR -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Total Change in Equity 2               34                   153          227          26            33            8               0-               11            13            
Reported Net Income 4 206       3 198              3 857       3 356       147          1 101       681          452          2 311       783-          
Reported Regulatory Capital 46 716    56 479           57 707    55 486    53 412    56 421    53 455    48 285    58 712    58 870    
Reported Return on Equity 9,28% 6,17% 10,65% 6,30% 0,27% 2,07% 1,33% 0,93% 3,80% -1,33%
Pre-reclassification Net Income 4 204       3 164              3 704       3 129       121          1 069       672          452          2 300       796-          
Pre-reclassification Total Regulatory Capital 46 715    56 446           57 554    55 260    53 386    56 388    53 447    48 285    58 701    58 857    
Pre-reclassification Return on Equity 9,28% 6,10% 10,27% 5,90% 0,23% 2,01% 1,31% 0,93% 3,78% -1,35%
Change in net income in terms of reported Net Income 0,04% 1,05% 3,97% 6,76% 17,81% 2,96% 1,24% -0,01% 0,47% -1,64%
Change in OCI in terms of reported regulatory Capital 0,00% 0,06% 0,27% 0,41% 0,05% 0,06% 0,02% 0,00% 0,02% 0,02%
Increase/Decrease in Reported income as a result of reclassification 0,04% 1,06% 4,13% 7,24% 21,67% 3,05% 1,26% -0,01% 0,47% -1,62%







 Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Reclassification 7 844       3 918              -           6 312       -           -           -           -           -           -           18 074     
HFT into LAR/HTM 7 077       2 760              -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           9 837       
HFT into AFS 767          -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           767           
AFS into LAR -           1 158              -           6 312       -           -           -           -           -           -           7 470       
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Total Assets 0,38% 0,19% -           0,32% -           -           -           -           -           -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Book value of Equity 13,38% 4,87% -           7,40% -           -           -           -           -           -           
 Total Change in Net Income 362          16                   27-            109          30            18            1               5               15            18-            
HFT into LAR/HTM 362          16                   27-            109          30            18            1               5               15            18-            
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Average Change in OCI
AFS into LAR -           133,39-           49,44-      242,39    238,28-    190,71-    313,33-    175,41-    122,36-    81,08-      
Total Change in Equity 362          118-                 77-            352          208-          172-          312-          171-          107-          99-            
Reported Net Income 3 452       6 474              9 164       6 894       7 318       5 424       507          7 044       8 115       8 207       
Reported Regulatory Capital 59 449    88 414           88 324    85 962    85 452    80 048    72 472    82 063    90 868    94 039    
Reported Return on Equity 5,85% 8,06% 10,70% 8,05% 7,78% 5,96% 0,54% 7,04% 7,71% 7,66%
Pre-reclassification Net Income 3 090       6 458              9 191       6 785       7 288       5 406       506          7 039       8 100       8 225       
Pre-reclassification Total Regulatory Capital 59 087    88 532           88 401    85 610    85 660    80 220    72 784    82 234    90 975    94 138    
Pre-reclassification Return on Equity 5,27% 8,03% 10,72% 7,96% 7,73% 5,93% 0,54% 7,02% 7,69% 7,66%
Change in net income in terms of reported Net Income 10,48% 0,24% -0,30% 1,59% 0,41% 0,34% 0,26% 0,07% 0,18% -0,22%
Change in OCI in terms of reported regulatory Capital 0,61% -0,13% -0,09% 0,41% -0,24% -0,22% -0,43% -0,21% -0,12% -0,11%
Increase/Decrease in Reported income as a result of reclassification 11,70% 0,24% -0,30% 1,61% 0,42% 0,34% 0,26% 0,07% 0,18% -0,22%







 Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Reclassification 18 486    20 399           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           38 885     
HFT into LAR/HTM 18 486    20 399           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           38 885     
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
AFS into LAR -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Total Assets 0,84% 1,36% -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Book value of Equity 63,15% 56,28% -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
 Total Change in Net Income 2 640       1 723              879          1 047       279          57            268-          115          368-          296-          
HFT into LAR/HTM 2 640       1 723              879          1 047       279          57            268-          115          368-          296-          
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Average Change in OCI
AFS into LAR -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Total Change in Equity 2 640       1 723              879          1 047       279          57            268-          115          368-          296-          
Reported Net Income 3 896-       4 958              2 330       4 326       316          681          1 691       6 772-       1 356-       735-          
Reported Regulatory Capital 37 396    37 929           48 688    55 226    57 015    55 464    63 072    60 976    59 502    63 250    
Reported Return on Equity -12,21% 13,06% 4,63% 7,91% 0,58% 1,24% 2,31% -10,80% -2,09% -1,08%
Pre-reclassification Net Income 6 536-       3 235              1 451       3 279       37            624          1 959       6 887-       988-          439-          
Pre-reclassification Total Regulatory Capital 34 756    36 206           47 809    54 179    56 736    55 407    63 340    60 861    59 870    63 546    
Pre-reclassification Return on Equity -22,33% 8,92% 2,93% 6,12% 0,07% 1,14% 2,67% -11,01% -1,52% -0,64%
Change in net income in terms of reported Net Income -67,77% 34,76% 37,74% 24,19% 88,33% 8,39% -15,86% -1,69% 27,16% 40,30%
Change in OCI in terms of reported regulatory Capital 7,06% 4,54% 1,81% 1,90% 0,49% 0,10% -0,43% 0,19% -0,62% -0,47%
Increase/Decrease in Reported income as a result of reclassification 40,39% 53,27% 60,61% 31,91% 756,74% 9,15% -13,69% 1,67% -37,29% -67,51%







 Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Reclassification 4 142       -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           4 142       
HFT into LAR/HTM 3 153       -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           3 153       
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
AFS into LAR 989          -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           989           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Total Assets 0,36% -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Book value of Equity 11,79% -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
 Total Change in Net Income 91            1 757              525          1 108       1 177       458          650          522          711          42            
HFT into LAR/HTM 91            1 757              525          1 108       1 177       458          650          522          711          42            
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Average Change in OCI
AFS into LAR -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Total Change in Equity 91            1 757              525          1 108       1 177       458          650          522          711          42            
Reported Net Income (2 696)     (75)                  4 033       3 023       2 377       2 990       3 366       3 800       4 488       3 705       
Reported Regulatory Capital 17 666    44 853           46 974    44 907    47 703    53 640    60 537    65 791    72 300    74 047    
Reported Return on Equity -7,66% -0,16% 7,85% 6,19% 4,37% 5,14% 5,37% 5,83% 6,49% 5,20%
Pre-reclassification Net Income (2 787)     (1 832)            3 508       1 915       1 200       2 532       2 716       3 278       3 778       3 663       
Pre-reclassification Total Regulatory Capital 17 575    43 096           46 449    43 799    46 526    53 182    59 887    65 269    71 590    74 005    
Pre-reclassification Return on Equity -7,93% -3,98% 6,90% 4,01% 2,26% 4,39% 4,38% 5,07% 5,52% 5,15%
Change in net income in terms of reported Net Income -3,36% -2342,26% 13,02% 36,66% 49,53% 15,30% 19,33% 13,73% 15,83% 1,14%
Change in OCI in terms of reported regulatory Capital 0,51% 3,92% 1,12% 2,47% 2,47% 0,85% 1,07% 0,79% 0,98% 0,06%
Increase/Decrease in Reported income as a result of reclassification 3,25% 95,91% 14,97% 57,88% 98,15% 18,07% 23,95% 15,92% 18,81% 1,15%







 Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Reclassification 12 126    454                 76            169          -           -           422          22            9               -           13 278     
HFT into LAR/HTM 12 126    454                 76            169          -           -           24            22            9               -           12 880     
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
AFS into LAR -           -                  -           -           -           -           398          -           -           -           398           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Total Assets 0,73% 0,03% 0,00% 0,01% -           -           0,03% 0,001% 0,001% -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Book value of Equity 26,09% 0,88% 0,15% 0,34% 0,00% 0,00% 0,75% 0,04% 0,01% -           
 Total Change in Net Income 853          657                 414          188          162          29            32            8               7               4               
HFT into LAR/HTM 853          657                 414          188          162          29            32            8               7               4               
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Average Change in OCI
AFS into LAR -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Total Change in Equity 853          657                 414          188          162          29            32            8               7               4               
Reported Net Income 1 266       1 446              1 752       (1 198)     (6 431)     2 885       2 760       3 971       3 955       4 217       
Reported Regulatory Capital 33 400    31 800           47 400    44 800    38 588    47 341    47 267    54 704    55 994    51 688    
Reported Return on Equity 2,67% 2,78% 3,36% -2,43% -14,08% 6,32% 4,91% 6,68% 6,19% 6,52%
Pre-reclassification Net Income 413          789                 1 338       (1 386)     (6 593)     2 856       2 728       3 963       3 948       4 213       
Pre-reclassification Total Regulatory Capital 32 547    31 143           46 986    44 612    38 426    47 312    47 235    54 696    55 987    51 684    
Pre-reclassification Return on Equity 0,89% 1,54% 2,59% -2,82% -14,48% 6,26% 4,86% 6,67% 6,18% 6,51%
Change in net income in terms of reported Net Income 67,35% 45,43% 23,63% -15,70% -2,52% 1,01% 1,16% 0,20% 0,18% 0,09%
Change in OCI in terms of reported regulatory Capital 2,55% 2,07% 0,87% 0,42% 0,42% 0,06% 0,07% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01%
Increase/Decrease in Reported income as a result of reclassification 206,31% 83,27% 30,95% 13,57% 2,46% 1,02% 1,17% 0,20% 0,18% 0,09%







 Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Reclassification 1 594       28 963           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           30 557     
HFT into LAR/HTM -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
AFS into LAR 1 594       28 963           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           30 557     
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Total Assets 0,12% 2,49% -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Book value of Equity 5,50% 72,88% -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
 Total Change in Net Income -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
HFT into LAR/HTM -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Average Change in OCI
AFS into LAR (40)           39                   444          1 050       221          135          (140)        76            48            31            
Total Change in Equity (40)           39                   444          1 050       221          135          (140)        76            48            31            
Reported Net Income (766)        (1 124)            2 916       5 868       4 523       3 810       1 440       4 413       4 726       4 987       
Reported Regulatory Capital 43 889    44 731           49 145    47 124    47 270    46 496    46 713    56 034    61 871    59 298    
Reported Return on Equity -5,14% -4,62% 7,82% 12,71% 7,68% 7,83% 6,24% 12,73% 11,71% 14,22%
Pre-reclassification Net Income (766)        (1 124)            2 916       5 868       4 523       3 810       1 440       4 413       4 726       4 987       
Pre-reclassification Total Regulatory Capital 43 929    44 692           48 701    46 074    47 049    46 361    46 853    55 958    61 823    59 267    
Pre-reclassification Return on Equity -2,64% -2,83% 6,31% 11,79% 8,23% 7,18% 2,42% 9,12% 9,39% 9,76%
Change in net income in terms of reported Net Income -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Change in OCI in terms of reported regulatory Capital -0,09% 0,09% 0,90% 2,23% 0,47% 0,29% -0,30% 0,14% 0,08% 0,05%
Increase/Decrease in Reported income as a result of reclassification -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           







 Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Reclassification 12 225    -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           12 225     
HFT into LAR/HTM 4 469       -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           4 469       
HFT into AFS 4 431       -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           4 431       
AFS into LAR 3 324       -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           3 324       
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Total Assets 2,01% -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Book value of Equity 39,49% -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
 Total Change in Net Income 319          154                 69            106          17            4               3               (2)             -           -           
HFT into LAR/HTM 319          154                 69            106          17            4               3               (2)             -           -           
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Average Change in OCI
AFS into LAR 439          137                 36            61            11            (59)           (31)           2               (3)             (5)             
Total Change in Equity 759          291                 105          167          28            (55)           (27)           1               (3)             (5)             
Reported Net Income 4 895       4 837              5 842       6 863       6 407       5 578       3 587       2 436       (258)        1 430       
Reported Regulatory Capital 43 094    49 054           59 637    66 092    67 714    74 859    75 718    65 463    77 514    66 281    
Reported Return on Equity 15,43% 12,09% 11,23% 12,80% 10,54% 8,67% 6,34% 4,62% -0,43% 2,30%
Pre-reclassification Net Income 4 575       4 683              5 773       6 756       6 390       5 574       3 584       2 437       (258)        1 430       
Pre-reclassification Total Regulatory Capital 42 336    48 763           59 532    65 925    67 686    74 915    75 745    65 462    77 517    66 286    
Pre-reclassification Return on Equity 14,78% 11,79% 11,12% 12,64% 10,52% 8,65% 6,33% 4,63% -0,43% 2,30%
Change in net income in terms of reported Net Income 6,52% 3,18% 1,18% 1,55% 0,26% 0,07% 0,09% -0,07% 0,00% 0,00%
Change in OCI in terms of reported regulatory Capital 1,76% 0,59% 0,18% 0,25% 0,04% -0,07% -0,04% 0,00% 0,00% -0,01%
Increase/Decrease in Reported income as a result of reclassification 6,98% 3,29% 1,19% 1,57% 0,26% 0,07% 0,09% -0,07% -           -           






 Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Reclassification 40 294    906                 -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           41 200     
HFT into LAR/HTM 40 294    906                 -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           41 200     
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
AFS into LAR -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Total Assets 1,34% 0,05% -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Book value of Equity 71,16% 1,28% -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
 Total Change in Net Income 3 903       1 125              (291)        409          90            -           -           -           -           -           
HFT into LAR/HTM 3 903       1 125              (291)        409          90            -           -           -           -           -           
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Average Change in OCI
AFS into LAR -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Total Change in Equity 3 903       1 125              (291)        409          90            -           -           -           -           -           
Reported Net Income (32 529)   (3 154)            10 682    5 420       (2 718)     4 161       4 421       6 813       3 582       1 253       
Reported Regulatory Capital 71 920    61 807           55 851    51 131    35 360    42 551    49 558    50 608    43 431    46 552    
Reported Return on Equity -53,74% -4,37% 17,51% 8,42% -4,58% 6,79% 6,77% 10,92% 6,15% 2,09%
Pre-reclassification Net Income (36 431)   (4 279)            10 973    5 012       (2 807)     4 161       4 421       6 813       3 582       1 253       
Pre-reclassification Total Regulatory Capital 68 017    60 682           56 142    50 722    35 271    42 551    49 558    50 608    43 431    46 552    
Pre-reclassification Return on Equity -64,34% -6,03% 17,90% 7,83% -4,74% 6,79% 6,77% 10,92% 6,15% 2,09%
Change in net income in terms of reported Net Income -12,00% -35,68% -2,72% 7,54% -3,29% -           -           -           -           -           
Change in OCI in terms of reported regulatory Capital 5,43% 1,82% -0,52% 0,80% 0,25% -           -           -           -           -           
Increase/Decrease in Reported income as a result of reclassification 10,71% 26,29% -2,65% 8,15% 3,19% -           -           -           -           -           







 Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Reclassification 20 139    118                 -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           20 257     
HFT into LAR/HTM 19 458    -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           19 458     
HFT into AFS -           118                 -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           118           
AFS into LAR 681          -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           681           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Total Assets 1,93% 0,01% -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Book value of Equity 35,95% 0,19% -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
 Total Change in Net Income 2 215       919                 641          758          1 738       -           (180)        (101)        (103)        (119)        
HFT into LAR/HTM 2 215       919                 641          758          1 738       -           (180)        (101)        (103)        (119)        
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Average Change in OCI
AFS into LAR 5               15                   11            39            150          33            1               1               1               -           
Total Change in Equity 2 220       933                 651          797          1 889       33            (180)        (101)        (102)        (119)        
Reported Net Income 4 529       2 035              1 645       8 842       1 223       (13 583)   2 388       669          (11 326)   5 786       
Reported Regulatory Capital 57 542    58 257           57 655    56 973    62 018    57 651    54 857    55 579    45 150    64 454    
Reported Return on Equity 7,78% 3,24% 2,43% 16,14% 1,87% -27,14% 4,52% 1,25% -26,22% 9,61%
Pre-reclassification Net Income 2 314       1 116              1 004       8 084       (515)        (13 583)   2 568       770          (11 223)   5 905       
Pre-reclassification Total Regulatory Capital 55 322    57 324           57 004    56 176    60 129    57 618    55 037    55 680    45 252    64 573    
Pre-reclassification Return on Equity 4,13% 1,80% 1,50% 14,97% -0,81% -27,15% 4,84% 1,44% -25,92% 9,79%
Change in net income in terms of reported Net Income 48,90% 45,15% 38,94% 8,57% 142,14% -           -7,55% -15,14% 0,91% -2,06%
Change in OCI in terms of reported regulatory Capital 3,86% 1,60% 1,13% 1,40% 3,05% 0,06% -0,33% -0,18% -0,23% -0,18%
Increase/Decrease in Reported income as a result of reclassification 95,71% 82,32% 63,76% 9,38% 337,31% -           -7,02% -13,15% 0,01         0,02-         




Royal Bank of Canada
 Reclassification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Reclassification 10 088    -                  -           2 632       -           -           -           6 136       -           -           18 856     
HFT into LAR/HTM -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
HFT into AFS 10 088    -                  -           2 632       -           -           -           -           -           -           12 720     
AFS into LAR -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           6 136       -           -           6 136       
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Total Assets 0,90% -                  -           0,24% -           -           -           0,40% -           -           0,15%
Reclassifications/Pre-reclassified Book value of Equity 21,34% -                  -           4,58% -           -           -           6,67% -           -           3,26%
 Total Change in Net Income -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
HFT into LAR/HTM -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
HFT into AFS -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Average Change in OCI
AFS into LAR -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           6               (11)           (16)           (21)           
Total Change in Equity -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           6               (11)           (16)           (21)           
Reported Net Income (31 403)   (33)                  10 813    6 053       (2 925)     4 541       5 347       9 007       5 047       1 518       
Reported Regulatory Capital 47 000    556                 52 468    56 355    55 220    60 062    73 472    81 811    95 515    98 049    
Reported Return on Equity -66,43% -0,06% 19,53% 10,53% -4,91% 6,48% 6,95% 9,79% 4,79% 1,36%
Pre-reclassification Net Income (31 403)   (33)                  10 813    6 053       (2 925)     4 541       5 347       9 007       5 047       1 518       
Pre-reclassification Total Regulatory Capital 47 000    556                 52 468    56 355    55 220    60 062    73 472    81 805    95 525    98 065    
Pre-reclassification Return on Equity -66,43% -0,06% 19,53% 10,53% -4,91% 6,48% 6,95% 9,79% 4,79% 1,36%
Change in net income in terms of reported Net Income -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Change in OCI in terms of reported regulatory Capital -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           0,01% -0,01% -0,02%
Increase/Decrease in Reported income as a result of reclassification -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           
Increase/Decrease in Reported regulatory Capital as a result of reclassification -           -                  -           -           -           -           -           0,01% -0,01% -0,02%
